GHSA-w8m4-4v35-v6x3
Duplicate Advisory: uutils coreutils allows unauthorized modification of permissions on existing files
- Severity
- 7.1 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- —
- No score published
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-pmf6-rcx4-v53v. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
A vulnerability in uutils coreutils mkfifo allows for the unauthorized modification of permissions on existing files. When mkfifo fails to create a FIFO because a file already exists at the target path, it fails to terminate the operation for that path and continues to execute a follow-up set_permissions call. This results in the existing file's permissions being changed to the default mode (often 644 after umask), potentially exposing sensitive files such as SSH private keys to other users on the system.
Affected versions
crates.io
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| coreutils | <= 0.8.0 |
No fix yet |
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
- Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Implementation, Installation: During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
- System Configuration: For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
- Documentation: Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
- Installation: Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
- Operation, System Configuration: Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
- Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Withdrawn
- Last updated by the source
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-m2pg-c7m6-77pj uutils coreutils has an Improper Input Validation Issue in its cut Utility | Medium | Also affects coreutils |
| GHSA-fhr3-xh3q-69w6 uutils coreutils has an Incorrect Provision of Specified Functionality Issue | Low | Also affects coreutils |
| GHSA-5pv5-xh52-hvrp uutils coreutils has an Incorrect Short Circuit Evaluation Issue | Low | Also affects coreutils |
| GHSA-5v4g-vw9x-h534 uutils coreutils has an Improper Input Validation Issue in its env Utility | Low | Also affects coreutils |
| GHSA-6g8r-74qp-6859 uutils coreutils has a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition | Medium | Also affects coreutils |
| GHSA-vx9m-xjwf-8cqm uutils coreutils has an Improper Handling of Unicode Encoding Issue | Low | Also affects coreutils |
| GHSA-4wrp-79m8-9m9p uutils coreutils has a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition | Medium | Also affects coreutils |
| GHSA-wq63-vh5h-pr5p uutils coreutils has a UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following issue | Medium | Also affects coreutils |
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