GHSA-vr7j-g7jv-h5mp CVE-2026-33572

OpenClaw session transcript files were created without forced user-only permissions

Medium npm

Severity: 0.0 / 10; Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.12%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 1.94% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-276 Incorrect Default Permissions; CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
Fix: 2026.2.17; Upgrade openclaw to this version or later

Description

openclaw created new session transcript JSONL files with overly broad default permissions in affected releases. On multi-user hosts, other local users or processes could read transcript contents, including secrets that might appear in tool output.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: <= 2026.2.15
First fixed version: 2026.2.17
Current latest npm release checked during verification: 2026.3.13 (not affected)

Impact

Session transcript JSONL files are created under the local OpenClaw session store. In affected releases, newly created transcript files did not force user-only permissions, so transcript contents could be readable by other local users depending on the host environment and umask behavior.

Fix

New transcript files are now created with 0o600 permissions. Existing transcript permission drift is also remediated by the security audit fix flow.

Verified in code:

src/config/sessions/transcript.ts:82 writes new transcript files with mode: 0o600
src/config/sessions/sessions.test.ts:303 includes regression coverage asserting 0o600

Fix Commit(s)

095d522099653367e1b76fa5bb09d4ddf7c8a57c

Release Note

This fix first shipped in 2026.2.17 and is present in the current npm release 2026.3.13.

Affected versions

npm

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
openclaw	`< 2026.2.17`	`2026.2.17`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openclaw npm → `2026.2.17`

npm

npm install openclaw@2026.2.17

yarn

yarn add openclaw@2026.2.17

pnpm

pnpm add openclaw@2026.2.17

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector: Local
Attack complexity: Low
Attack requirements: Present
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system): High
Integrity (vulnerable system): None
Availability (vulnerable system): None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems): None
Integrity (subsequent systems): None
Availability (subsequent systems): None

CVSS 3.1 5.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector: Local
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-276: Incorrect Default Permissions

During installation, installed file permissions are set to allow anyone to modify those files.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design, Operation: The architecture needs to access and modification attributes for files to only those users who actually require those actions.
Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource

The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.

How to prevent it

Implementation: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Implementation, Installation: During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
System Configuration: For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
Documentation: Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
Installation: Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
Operation, System Configuration: Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33572

Packages

github.com/openclaw/openclaw

Timeline

Mar 16, 2026 Published
Jun 17, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-3x84-qq85-fj65 OpenClaw: Browser CDP discovery could accept blocked WebSocket URLs	High	Also affects openclaw
GHSA-9c3v-684m-579c OpenClaw MCP SSE redirects could forward Authorization headers	Medium	Also affects openclaw
GHSA-f397-5vjw-v2c2 OpenClaw: Shell inline-command parsing could miss an allowlist check	High	Also affects openclaw
GHSA-rx78-29qr-5hq8 OpenClaw: Workspace-derived service PATH could influence trash command selection	High	Also affects openclaw
GHSA-ccwh-wwpp-6wg5 OpenClaw: Host environment sanitizer missed two Node.js control variables	High	Also affects openclaw
GHSA-985f-72mj-8gf7 OpenClaw: Tool group policy callers could accept unvalidated group IDs	Medium	Also affects openclaw
GHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c OpenClaw: Bootstrap token replay could widen pending pairing scopes	Medium	Also affects openclaw
GHSA-c226-q6fx-6j6c OpenClaw: macOS Swift exec allowlist missed combined POSIX inline flags	Medium	Also affects openclaw

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