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GHSA-vq8p-m3wm-gv5f CVE-2026-48484 PYSEC-2026-4293

pyLoad: Lack of Input Size Validation Leads to Denial of Service (DoS) and Process Termination

Medium PyPI
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.37%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 31.08% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Fix
0.5.0b3.dev101
Upgrade pyload-ng to this version or later

Description

Description:

The API rpc function in api_blueprint.py handles multipart/form-data uploads by reading the whole content of the uploaded file into memory with file.read(). This occurs before the data is sent to the underlying function. Since there is no size limit set at this point, a large file upload can exhaust the server's available memory which led to process termination.

VulnerableCode & Path:

https://github.com/pyload/pyload/blob/8e447958b8a66c5899775e725a8b90bce6643004/src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/api_blueprint.py#L73

Steps to Reproduce:

  1. Log in to pyLoad (or use an API key, here i used api to communicate).
  2. Prepare a large file (e.g., 10GB) .
truncate -s 10G large_file.bin
  1. Send a multipart request to an API function that accepts a file, such as check_online_status_container:
curl -X POST "http://localhost:8000/api/rpc" \
     -H "X-API-Key: YOUR_API_KEY" \
     -F "func=check_online_status_container" \
     -F "container=@large_file.bin"
  1. Monitor the server's memory usage. The process will attempt to allocate memory for the entire file and last the process will be killed by the kernel. <img width="1902" height="610" alt="dos-process-kill-poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2b9bfd0f-5b9f-48dd-983f-f97dfcc358cc" />

Impact

  • Denial of Service (DoS): The pyLoad process will be killed by the Operating System's Out-Of-Memory (OOM) killer, or the entire system may become unresponsive due to swap thrashing or memory exhaustion.
  • Service Instability: Any active downloads or tasks will be interrupted.

Mitigations

  • Implement File Size Limits: Enforce a maximum size for uploaded files in the web server configuration (e.g., Nginx client_max_body_size).

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pyload-ng
< 0.5.0b3.dev101
0.5.0b3.dev101

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

pyload-ng PyPI → 0.5.0b3.dev101

pip
pip install --upgrade "pyload-ng>=0.5.0b3.dev101"
poetry
poetry add "pyload-ng>=0.5.0b3.dev101"
uv
uv add "pyload-ng>=0.5.0b3.dev101"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-20: Improper Input Validation

The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Consider using language-theoretic security (LangSec) techniques that characterize inputs using a formal language and build "recognizers" for that language. This effectively requires parsing to be a distinct layer that effectively enforces a boundary between raw input and internal data representations, instead of allowing parser code to be scattered throughout the program, where it could be subject to errors or inconsistencies that create weaknesses. [REF-1109] [REF-1110] [REF-1111]
  • Architecture and Design: Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. Note that using a framework does not automatically address all input validation problems; be mindful of weaknesses that could arise from misusing the framework itself (CWE-1173).
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter the product, including but not limited to: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server. Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
  • Implementation: When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
  • Implementation: Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
  • Implementation: Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control. Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
  • Implementation: When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-68w4-83fh-f2w8
pyload-ng: getUserData/get_userdata exposed at Perms.ANY allow any authenticated account to brute-force the administrator password
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-9q47-3cm2-2rp8
pyLoad: Rate-Limit Bypass and Audit-Log Spoofing via Trusted Client-Controlled `X-Forwarded-For` Header
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-jq7h-wrvp-3rgx
pyLoad: Privilege revocation and password change through the REST API do not invalidate the user's session
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-889w-m37p-88m5
pyLoad: Api.set_user_permission never invalidates the target's session
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-p3pr-8f3m-4qp8
pyLoad WindowsPhoneNotify addon: non-admin SETTINGS user triggers SSRF via unguarded http.client notification host
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-fr26-jjhm-638c
pyLoad: Tar extraction creates device nodes and FIFOs (member types not filtered; tarfile extractall without filter=)
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-r44w-v6gf-x3p6
pyLoad has an authentication bypass in API key validation (check_apikey cache)
High Also affects pyload-ng
GHSA-j92p-c242-7hfx
pyLoad: Unauthenticated access to /web/<path:filename> bypasses authentication on sensitive templates and leaks internal error details via exception attribute typo
Medium Also affects pyload-ng
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