GHSA-vp88-798v-h67f RUSTSEC-2026-0347
rustls: ECH rejection can expose buffered application data to authenticated outer server before `ech_required` alert
- Severity
- 2.3 / 10
- Low · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- —
- No score published
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- Fix
0.23.46- Upgrade rustls to this version or later
Description
In rustls 0.23.44 and 0.23.45, application data that a client buffers before the handshake completes is sent to the server even when the server rejects Encrypted Client Hello (ECH).
When the server rejects ECH, the client completes the handshake with the outer ClientHello and authenticates the server against the ECH config's public_name. At the end of the handshake, start_traffic() encrypts and queues any plaintext buffered by ClientConnection::writer(). It does this before checking for EchStatus::Rejected and queueing the ech_required alert.
The application then receives Error::PeerIncompatible(ServerRejectedEncryptedClientHello), as expected. However, the client is still expected to call write_tls() to send the fatal alert, and that call also sends the encrypted application data. The server decrypts the data and only then receives the alert.
The ordering bug is older than 0.23.44. Before 0.23.44, the client checked the server certificate against the inner server name rather than public_name, so a correctly configured server failed certificate verification first and no data was sent. 0.23.44 fixed that check, which makes the ordinary rejection path reachable.
Impact
Plaintext meant for the inner server, the one named in the encrypted ClientHello, goes to the client-facing server identified by public_name. That server is properly authenticated, so this is not an attack by an unauthenticated party. However this violates RFC 9849, which says the following:
- Section 6.1.6: if the handshake and authentication succeed after ECH rejection, the client "MUST ... abort the connection with an "ech_required" alert before sending any application data to the server."
- Section 6.1.7: the certificate is checked only against
public_name, and the connection "MUST NOT" be reported as successful to the application. rustls does report failure correctly. The problem is only that data is sent before the alert.
This affects only clients that meet all of these conditions:
- They use
EchMode::Enable. GREASE ECH is not affected. - They write application data before the handshake completes.
- They connect to a server that rejects their ECH config, for example because the config is stale. This is the same case where the server returns retry configs.
The usual client response to rejection is to retry with the server's retry configs. In that case, the data has already gone to the outer server.
Affected versions
crates.io
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| rustls | >= 0.23.44, < 0.23.46 |
0.23.46 |
| rustls | >= 0.24.0-dev.1, < 0.24.0-dev.2 |
0.24.0-dev.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
rustls crates.io → 0.23.46
- cargo
cargo update -p rustls --precise 0.23.46
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 2.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
References
Packages
Other links
- github.com/rustls/rustls/security/advisories/GHSA-vp88-798v-h67f
- github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3300
- github.com/rustls/rustls/pull/3354
- github.com/rustls/rustls/commit/2bd5c0cefabb2c5fd4100383a736d59f9671b9b4
- github.com/rustls/rustls/commit/4de14a508fbfa2273203ec17d9dfdd0fbd29e8d1
- github.com/rustls/rustls/commit/7dcbe4c1ae12185237d22e9197583329630a2014
- github.com/rustls/rustls/releases/tag/v/0.23.46
- rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0347.html
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-w44r-93j7-qv28 rustls: An unauthenticated ServerHello poisons the per-name key-exchange record, so later ClientHellos carry only a classical X25519 share | Low | Also affects rustls |
| GHSA-h2v8-394m-p7vv Rustls: Brotli certificate decompression can allocate an attacker-controlled amount of memory up to 1 GiB before authentication. | Low | Also affects rustls |
| GHSA-c8m5-c952-6cm4 Rustls: Session Debug formatting exposes TLS master secrets and resumption PSKs | Medium | Also affects rustls |
| GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc Rustls: TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries | Medium | Also affects rustls |
| GHSA-qg5g-gv98-5ffh rustls network-reachable panic in `Acceptor::accept` | High | Also affects rustls |
| GHSA-6g7w-8wpp-frhj Denial of Service Vulnerability in Rustls Library | High | Also affects rustls |
| GHSA-j7qq-vr8c-xvw3 MLflow CrewAI autologging records LLM provider API keys in logged trace spans | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-200 |
| GHSA-gqh3-7856-rjjg ApostropheCMS: :_id/locales REST route omits the public-API authorization gate its sibling read routes enforce (unauthenticated doc-existence + locale metadata disclosure) | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-200 |
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