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GHSA-vp6v-whfm-rv3g CVE-2024-53863 PYSEC-2026-1615

Synapse can be forced to thumbnail unexpected file formats, invoking external, potentially untrustworthy decoders

Critical PyPI
Severity
0.0 / 10
Critical · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.61%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 49.01% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
Fix
1.120.1
Upgrade matrix-synapse to this version or later

Description

Impact

In Synapse versions before 1.120.1, enabling the dynamic_thumbnails option or processing a specially crafted request could trigger the decoding and thumbnail generation of uncommon image formats, potentially invoking external tools like Ghostscript for processing.

This significantly expands the attack surface in a historically vulnerable area, presenting a risk that far outweighs the benefit, particularly since these formats are rarely used on the open web or within the Matrix ecosystem.

For a list of image formats, as well as decoding libraries and helper programs used, see the Pillow documentation.

Patches

Synapse 1.120.1 addresses the issue by restricting thumbnail generation to images in the following widely used formats: PNG, JPEG, GIF, and WebP.

Workarounds

  • Ensure any image codecs and helper programs, such as Ghostscript, are patched against security vulnerabilities.
  • Uninstall unused image decoder libraries and helper programs, such as Ghostscript, from the system environment that Synapse is running in.
    • Depending on the installation method, there may be some decoder libraries bundled with Pillow and these cannot be easily uninstalled.
    • The official Docker container image does not include Ghostscript.

References

  • The Pillow documentation includes a list of supported image formats and which libraries or helper programs are used to decode them.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at security at element.io.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
matrix-synapse
< 1.120.1
1.120.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

matrix-synapse PyPI → 1.120.1

pip
pip install --upgrade "matrix-synapse>=1.120.1"
poetry
poetry add "matrix-synapse>=1.120.1"
uv
uv add "matrix-synapse>=1.120.1"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 9.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]
  • Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • Architecture and Design: Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.
  • Architecture and Design: Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.
  • Implementation: Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]
  • Implementation: When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.
  • Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-6qf2-7x63-mm6v
Synapse pagination Denial of Service
Low Also affects matrix-synapse
GHSA-8q93-326v-3m7g
Synapse CPU starvation (Denial of Service)
Medium Also affects matrix-synapse
GHSA-fh66-fcv5-jjfr
Synapse's invalid device keys degrade federation functionality
Medium Also affects matrix-synapse
GHSA-v56r-hwv5-mxg6
Synapse vulnerable to federation denial of service via malformed events
High Also affects matrix-synapse
GHSA-56w4-5538-8v8h
Synapse Matrix has a partial room state leak via Sliding Sync
Medium Also affects matrix-synapse
GHSA-f3r3-h2mq-hx2h
Synapse allows a a malformed invite to break the invitee's `/sync`
Medium Also affects matrix-synapse
GHSA-rfq8-j7rh-8hf2
Synapse allows unsupported content types to lead to memory exhaustion
High Also affects matrix-synapse
GHSA-gjgr-7834-rhxr
Synapse's unauthenticated writes to the media repository allow planting of problematic content
Medium Also affects matrix-synapse
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