GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86 CVE-2026-59801 CVE-2026-62327 CVE-2026-62328
9router has unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats
- Severity
- 9.3 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 6.27%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 93.58% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
- CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- CWE-862 Missing Authorization
- Fix
- None yet
- No fixed version published
Description
title: Unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats product: 9Router version: <= 0.4.41 severity: critical cve_request: true
Summary
Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The /api/providers endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, /api/usage/stats exposes full plaintext API keys, and /api/usage/request-logs + /api/usage/request-details expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication.
Affected Endpoints
| Endpoint | Method | Issue |
|---|---|---|
/api/providers |
GET | Lists all provider connections with partial credentials, OAuth tokens, account IDs |
/api/providers/:id |
GET | Read any single provider detail (IDOR) |
/api/providers |
POST | Create arbitrary provider connections with attacker-controlled API keys |
/api/providers/:id |
PUT | Modify any existing provider connection |
/api/providers/:id |
DELETE | Delete any provider connection |
/api/usage/stats |
GET | Exposes full plaintext API keys, per-account usage breakdown, cost data |
/api/usage/request-logs |
GET | Exposes all users' request logs (model, tokens, cost, timestamp, provider) |
/api/usage/request-details/:id |
GET | Exposes full conversation turns including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses |
/api/version |
GET | Exposes current version info |
/api/models |
GET | Exposes full model routing catalog |
/api/v1/models |
GET | Exposes model list |
Impact
Critical: Provider CRUD without authentication
An attacker can:
- Add a malicious provider — inject a provider that proxies through their server, capturing all prompts, responses, and API keys routed through 9Router
- Modify existing providers — replace API keys with attacker-controlled ones, redirect traffic
- Delete all providers — cause complete denial of service
- Read all provider configurations — harvest partial credentials, GitHub Copilot OAuth tokens, Cloudflare account IDs, email addresses
Critical: Full API key leak via /api/usage/stats
The endpoint returns complete API key strings (e.g., sk-...) in plaintext alongside usage data per key, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts.
Critical: Conversation history leak
/api/usage/request-details returns the full conversation history of other users' AI sessions, including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and reasoning traces.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Unauthenticated read of all providers
curl -s https://<host>/api/providers
Returns all provider connections with email addresses, auth type, account IDs, and partial API key prefixes.
2. Create a provider without authentication
curl -X POST https://<host>/api/providers \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"provider":"openai","authType":"apikey","name":"rogue","apiKey":"sk-attacker-controlled"}'
Returns the created connection object with a new UUID and isActive: true.
3. Modify an existing provider without authentication
curl -X PUT https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"modified","apiKey":"sk-attacker-key"}'
Returns the updated connection object.
4. Delete a provider without authentication
curl -X DELETE https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid>
Returns {"message":"Connection deleted successfully"}.
5. Read full usage stats with API keys
curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/stats
Returns full API key strings, per-account token/cost breakdown, recent requests.
6. Read request logs
curl -s "https://<host>/api/usage/request-logs?page=1&pageSize=50"
Returns paginated request logs with timestamps, models, providers, user emails, token counts.
7. Read full conversation
curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/request-details/<request-uuid>
Returns complete conversation turns for that request.
8. Read version info
curl -s https://<host>/api/version
Returns {"currentVersion":"0.4.19","latestVersion":"0.4.45","hasUpdate":true}.
Root Cause
The Next.js API routes under src/app/api/* lack authentication middleware on several endpoints. Specifically:
/api/providers/*— No auth check before CRUD operations on provider connections stored in the database/api/usage/stats— No auth check before returning aggregated usage data including full API keys/api/usage/request-logs— No auth check before returning request history/api/usage/request-details/:id— No auth check before returning full conversation contents
Suggested Fix
- Add authentication middleware to all
/api/providers/*routes (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE) - Add authentication middleware to all
/api/usage/*routes - Never return full API key strings in any API response — return masked keys only
- Never return GitHub Copilot tokens or similar OAuth secrets in API responses
- Implement proper authorization checks so users can only access their own data
- Add rate limiting to public endpoints
Resources
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| 9router | <= 0.4.41 |
No fix yet |
How to fix
No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 9.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- High
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- High
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
- Exploit maturity
- Not defined
- Scope
- X
CVSS 3.1 10.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
- Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].
CWE-862: Missing Authorization
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Packages
Other links
- github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86
- vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-unauthenticated-api-exposure-via-api-providers
- vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-unauthenticated-api-key-exposure-via-api-usage-stats
- vulncheck.com/advisories/9router-unauthenticated-information-disclosure-via-api-us…
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-32gc-64m7-hj7v 9Router has a Login Brute-Force Lockout Bypass via Spoofable X-9r-Real-Ip Header | Medium | Also affects 9router |
| GHSA-5mj8-gf6m-fhw8 9Router has an Authentication Bypass in Public LLM API via Spoofable X-9r-Real-Ip Header | High | Also affects 9router |
| GHSA-8g4w-4ffg-8vgx 9Router: Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via OIDC Provider Test Endpoint | High | Also affects 9router |
| GHSA-vmjq-hvgq-2wv4 9router: Mass assignment in PATCH /api/settings allows authenticated authorization downgrade | High | Also affects 9router |
| GHSA-6mwv-4mrm-5p3m 9router: Kiro region injection allows authenticated SSRF with Authorization header forwarding | Medium | Also affects 9router |
| GHSA-x5c9-v98j-722r 9router /v1 APIs has unauthenticated access via reverse proxy locality collapse | High | Also affects 9router |
| GHSA-86m2-fcxq-5q7c 9router: Unauthenticated `/v1` proxy access via `Host`-header spoofing → open AI relay + SSRF | High | Also affects 9router |
| GHSA-8gmq-j984-vp4r 9router: Unauthenticated LLM proxy access via /codex rewrite authorization bypass | High | Also affects 9router |
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