GHSA-v778-237x-gjrc CVE-2024-45337 GO-2024-3321
Misuse of ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback may cause authorization bypass in golang.org/x/crypto
- Severity
- 9.1 / 10
- Critical · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 3.18%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 88.07% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-285 Improper Authorization
- Fix
0.31.0- Upgrade golang.org/x/crypto to this version or later
Description
Applications and libraries which misuse the ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback callback may be susceptible to an authorization bypass.
The documentation for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback says that "A call to this function does not guarantee that the key offered is in fact used to authenticate." Specifically, the SSH protocol allows clients to inquire about whether a public key is acceptable before proving control of the corresponding private key. PublicKeyCallback may be called with multiple keys, and the order in which the keys were provided cannot be used to infer which key the client successfully authenticated with, if any. Some applications, which store the key(s) passed to PublicKeyCallback (or derived information) and make security relevant determinations based on it once the connection is established, may make incorrect assumptions.
For example, an attacker may send public keys A and B, and then authenticate with A. PublicKeyCallback would be called only twice, first with A and then with B. A vulnerable application may then make authorization decisions based on key B for which the attacker does not actually control the private key.
Since this API is widely misused, as a partial mitigation golang.org/x/crypto@v0.31.0 enforces the property that, when successfully authenticating via public key, the last key passed to ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback will be the key used to authenticate the connection. PublicKeyCallback will now be called multiple times with the same key, if necessary. Note that the client may still not control the last key passed to PublicKeyCallback if the connection is then authenticated with a different method, such as PasswordCallback, KeyboardInteractiveCallback, or NoClientAuth.
Users should be using the Extensions field of the Permissions return value from the various authentication callbacks to record data associated with the authentication attempt instead of referencing external state. Once the connection is established the state corresponding to the successful authentication attempt can be retrieved via the ServerConn.Permissions field. Note that some third-party libraries misuse the Permissions type by sharing it across authentication attempts; users of third-party libraries should refer to the relevant projects for guidance.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| golang.org/x/crypto | < 0.31.0 |
0.31.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
golang.org/x/crypto Go → 0.31.0
- go
go get golang.org/x/crypto@v0.31.0 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 9.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-285: Improper Authorization
The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/golang/crypto/commit/b4f1988a35dee11ec3e05d6bf3e90b695fbd8909
- go.dev/cl/635315
- go.dev/issue/70779
- groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/-nPEi39gI4Q/m/cGVPJCqdAQAJ
- pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3321
- security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250131-0007
- openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/12/11/2
- security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250131-0007
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GO-2026-6355 Prevent DoS on deadlocked established channel in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh | High | Also affects golang.org/x/crypto |
| GO-2026-6354 Prevent DoS on deadlocked undecided channel in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh | High | Also affects golang.org/x/crypto |
| GO-2026-6303 Source-address critical option not enforced for non-public-key auth callbacks in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh | High | Also affects golang.org/x/crypto |
| GO-2026-5932 The golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp package is unmaintained, unsafe by design, and has known security issues | Not rated yet | Also affects golang.org/x/crypto |
| GHSA-x527-x647-q7gg golang.org/x/crypto: Invoking VerifiedPublicKeyCallback permissions skip enforcement | Critical | Also affects golang.org/x/crypto |
| GHSA-w879-237q-wc7r golang.org/x/crypto: Invoking pathological RSA/DSA parameters may cause DoS | High | Also affects golang.org/x/crypto |
| GHSA-vgwf-h737-ff37 golang.org/x/crypto: Invoking client can cause server deadlock on unexpected responses | Critical | Also affects golang.org/x/crypto |
| GHSA-rm3j-f69w-wqmq golang.org/x/crypto vulnerable to infinite loop on large channel writes | Critical | Also affects golang.org/x/crypto |
Credits: Damien Tournoud (Platform.sh / Upsun), Jules Duvivier (Platform.sh / Upsun), Patrick Dawkins (Platform.sh / Upsun), Vince Parker (Platform.sh / Upsun)
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