GHSA-v529-vhwc-wfc5 CVE-2026-42087 PYSEC-2026-2244

OpenC3 COSMOS has SQL Injection in QuestDB Time-Series Database

Critical PyPIRubyGems

Severity: 9.6 / 10; Critical · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.32%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 25.32% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Fix: Available; 2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Vulnerability Type: CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') Attack type: Authenticated remote Impact: Telemetry data disclosure and deletion Affected components: openc3-tsdb (QuestDB)

A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Time-Series Database (TSDB) component of COSMOS. The tsdb_lookup function in the cvt_model.rb file directly places user-supplied input into a SQL query without sanitizing the input. As a result, a user can break out of the initial SQL statement and execute arbitrary SQL commands, including deleting data.

Figure 1: Source code vulnerable to SQL injection Additionally, the get_tlm_values RPC endpoint only requires “tlm” permissions, allowing any user with the Admin, Operator, Viewer, or Runner roles to send a request to the TSDB. This permission is defined in roles-permissions.md to allow for the user to view telemetry data, but this vulnerability also allows them to delete data and tables.

Figure 2: Source code showing the required permissions for the get_tlm_values endpoint Sending a normal request to the endpoint brings back a single array of values for the parameter:

Figure 3: A normal request to the get_tlm_values endpoint However, sending a specially crafted request within the start_time variable brings back all the data in the database:

Figure 4: The request and response after sending the SQL injection payload This payload can be modified to executes SQL commands in the TSDB.

Figure 5: SQL injection used to execute arbitrary SQL command The user can then delete all the historical data in the database:

Figure 6: Example payload dropping the tables

Steps to Reproduce

Capture a JSON-RPC request to the get_tlm_values endpoint.
Add the start_time key to the request body and place the following in the value:

‘ OR 1=1 --

Retrieve all database data.

Recommendations

• Sanitize all user-supplied input before executing it • Use prepared statements with parameterized queries when executing SQL statements

Affected versions

PyPI

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
openc3	`>= 6.7.0, < 7.0.0`	`7.0.0`

RubyGems

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
openc3	`>= 6.7.0, < 7.0.0-rc3`	`7.0.0-rc3`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openc3 PyPI → `7.0.0`

pip

pip install --upgrade "openc3>=7.0.0"

poetry

poetry add "openc3>=7.0.0"

uv

uv add "openc3>=7.0.0"

openc3 RubyGems → `7.0.0-rc3`

bundler

bundle update openc3 # Gemfile: gem "openc3", ">= 7.0.0-rc3"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 9.6

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Architecture and Design: If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated. Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations. Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Implementation: While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88). Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping. Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the data
Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42087

Packages

github.com/OpenC3/cosmos

Timeline

Apr 23, 2026 Published
Oct 26, 2026 Last updated by the source
Nov 1, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-jjq7-m736-w977 OpenC3 COSMOS: Authenticated remote code execution via the user-writable config overlay (table definitions, cmd/tlm definitions, and script suites)	Critical	Also affects openc3
GHSA-vp3w-52v9-q57f OpenC3 COSMOS: Authenticated OS command injection via the `pypi_url` setting	High	Also affects openc3
GHSA-2wvh-87g2-89hr OpenC3 COSMOS: Permissions Bypass Provides User Access to Unassigned Administrative Actions via Script Runner Tool	High	Also affects openc3
GHSA-ffq5-qpvf-xq7x OpenC3 COSMOS is Vulnerable to Self-XSS Through the Command Sender	Medium	Also affects openc3
GHSA-4jvx-93h3-f45h OpenC3 COSMOS allows arbitrary writes to plugins directory via path-traversed config filenames	Medium	Also affects openc3
GHSA-wgx6-g857-jjf7 OpenC3 COSMOS: Hijacked session token can be used to reset password for persistence	High	Also affects openc3
GHSA-w757-4qv9-mghp openc3-api Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution	Critical	Also affects openc3
GHSA-4xqv-47rm-37mm OpenC3 stores passwords in clear text (`GHSL-2024-129`)	Medium	Also affects openc3

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