GHSA-v39v-59xw-j98g CVE-2026-87012 PYSEC-2026-4126
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can suppress calendar alerts instance-wide via a non-numeric alert value
- Severity
- 4.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.48%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 41.74% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-1287 Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
- CWE-754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
- Fix
0.11.1- Upgrade open-webui to this version or later
Description
Any authenticated user can suppress calendar alerts instance-wide via a non-numeric alert value
Summary
Calendar events carry a free-form meta object that is stored exactly as submitted, with no validation of the values inside it. The scheduler reads the per-event alert offset out of that object in a single pass that covers every user's upcoming events, and compares it numerically without checking that it is a number. Any verified user could store a text value there, which made the comparison raise and abort the whole pass, so no calendar reminder fired for anyone on the instance while that event stayed inside the lookahead window.
Preconditions
- Calendar is enabled (
ENABLE_CALENDAR/calendar.enable, defaultTrue). - The attacker is a verified user (role
useroradmin) holding thecalendarfeature permission, which is granted to all users by default (USER_PERMISSIONS_FEATURES_CALENDAR, defaultTrue). - The event's start time falls inside the scheduler's one hour lookahead window, so the shared alert pass selects it.
No admin access, no shared calendar, no recurrence rule and no open registration are required, an invited account is enough. Deployments running with the calendar disabled, or with the calendar feature permission removed from regular users, are not affected.
Impact
Availability loss on one feature, affecting every user on the instance. While a single event carrying a non-numeric alert value sat in the upcoming window, the shared alert pass raised before emitting anything, so no user received calendar alerts and no event was recorded as alerted. The same events were selected again on the next poll, so the suppression lasted as long as the event stayed in the window, roughly one hour per event, and could be sustained by storing a new one. Every user on a default deployment holds the permission needed to do this.
Chat, timers, automations and the HTTP API kept working throughout, and authenticated calendar reads continued to succeed. There is no crash, no code execution, and no access to other users' data. Alerts resumed on their own once the event left the window or was deleted.
Fix
Fixed in https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/28790, released in 0.11.1. The scheduler now treats any non-numeric alert value as unset and falls back to the default alert offset, so a stored text value can no longer interrupt the pass. Upgrading is sufficient and no configuration change is required. Events already holding a bad value simply revert to the default alert timing.
Root cause
Affected component: the upcoming-event lookup in the calendar event model, which the scheduler's alert pass calls every poll. Affected setup: every build carrying the calendar feature, which was introduced in 0.9.0.
Event meta is an untyped dictionary and was written to the database exactly as submitted, so nothing on the write path guaranteed that the alert offset was a number. The alert pass then read that value back and compared it numerically on the assumption that the write path had already constrained it, and the loop had no per-event error handling. Because a single background pass serves the whole instance rather than one user at a time, one unusable value from one user aborted the pass for everyone.
Proof of concept
Reported with a scripted reproduction against 0.11.0 (ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:latest) with the calendar enabled and two ordinary user accounts. The first account created an upcoming event with the alert offset stored as the text "5", the second created a normal upcoming event with a numeric offset. Across several scheduler polls the second user's event was never marked as alerted and no alert was delivered, while the server logged a type error from the alert pass on each poll. Health checks and authenticated calendar reads returned normally during the fault. After the first account's event was deleted, the second user's event was marked as alerted on the next poll and alerting resumed.
Credits
Binbin Xu of Tencent YUNDING LAB CodeBuddy Security.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| open-webui | >= 0.9.0, < 0.11.1 |
0.11.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
open-webui PyPI → 0.11.1
- pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.11.1"- poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.11.1"- uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.11.1"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 4.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input
The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Choose languages with features such as exception handling that force the programmer to anticipate unusual conditions that may generate exceptions. Custom exceptions may need to be developed to handle unusual business-logic conditions. Be careful not to pass sensitive exceptions back to the user (CWE-209, CWE-248).
- Implementation: Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is expected.
- Implementation: If using exception handling, catch and throw specific exceptions instead of overly-general exceptions (CWE-396, CWE-397). Catch and handle exceptions as locally as possible so that exceptions do not propagate too far up the call stack (CWE-705). Avoid unchecked or uncaught exceptions where feasible (CWE-248).
- Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. Exposing additional information to a potential attacker in the context of an exceptional condition can help the attacker determine what attack vectors are most likely to succeed beyond DoS.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Architecture and Design: Use system limits, which should help to prevent resource exhaustion. However, the product should still handle low resource conditions since they may still occur.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-wvm9-9g5j-623f Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-4qg5-cxx4-g927 Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-jqhh-cjmq-vmv6 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-5x7x-4c3c-qf5w Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-34r3-9m95-vq73 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach the Azure platform channel via server-side web fetch | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-2724-6cpj-gf3v Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3pf7-q2g3-wj28 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
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