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GHSA-r9r3-g9fp-3q4q CVE-2026-55703

Snipe-IT: Maintenance Record Disclosure via Missing Authorization on GET

Medium Packagist
Severity
4.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.34%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 27.74% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Fix
8.6.3
Upgrade snipe/snipe-it to this version or later

Description

Impact

Any activated account in a company can read every maintenance record for that company (asset tag, supplier, purchase cost, free-text notes, dates) without holding any asset or maintenance permission.

Summary

MaintenancesController::show() renders a maintenance record without any authorization check. Every other action in the controller authorizes against the asset; show() does not. Any user in the asset's company can read maintenance detail (asset tag, supplier, purchase cost, notes, dates) by visiting /maintenances/{id}, regardless of permissions.

Details

public function show(Maintenance $maintenance): View|RedirectResponse
{
    return view('maintenances.view')->with('maintenance', $maintenance);
}

No authorize() call. The sibling actions all gate on the asset: index() calls authorize('view', Asset::class) (line 33), and edit()/update()/destroy() call authorize('update', $maintenance->asset) (lines 139, 166, 286). The route is registered with only the auth guard:

Route::resource('maintenances', MaintenancesController::class, ['middleware' => ['auth']]);

(routes/web/hardware.php:185). Route-model binding still applies the company scope, so the read is bounded to the caller's company; the absent permission gate is the defect. Maintenance IDs are sequential and visible in the record URL.

Proof of concept

  1. As an administrator, create an asset in a company (here, CompanyA). Open the asset, choose Maintenances > Create, and add a record: name MntA2, supplier SupA, a purchase cost, and notes. The saved record opens at /maintenances/{id}.
  2. As the administrator, create a test user assigned to CompanyA, with every permission left unchecked. Activate the account.
  3. In a separate browser session, log in as the test user. Confirm it is unprivileged: the Assets and Maintenances navigation items are absent, and browsing to /hardware returns 403.
  4. In the address bar, browse to http://<host>/maintenances/{id}.

Observed: the maintenance view renders in full for the unprivileged account.

GET /maintenances/5      ->  HTTP 200 OK
Renders the "Maintenance" detail page for MntA2:
  Asset: AssetA   Supplier: SupA   Cost: <value>   Notes: <text>   Dates: <...>

GET /hardware            ->  HTTP 403  (same account, asset list is gated)
GET /maintenances        ->  HTTP 403  (same account, maintenance list is gated)
GET /maintenances/2      ->  HTTP 302  (record in CompanyB; company scope still hides it)
  • The test account holds zero permissions and still reads the record.
  • Only the unguarded show route leaks: the list view and the asset pages return 403 for the same account.
  • A maintenance in a different company (CompanyB) redirects away, confirming the FMCS company scope still holds.

Patches

Patched in https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/69c50aa2aee25f837626556b4f4f3d05ec7ace96

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
snipe/snipe-it
< 8.6.3
8.6.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

snipe/snipe-it Packagist → 8.6.3

composer
composer require snipe/snipe-it:^8.6.3

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 4.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-862: Missing Authorization

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
  • Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
  • System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-396x-xmvh-p563
Snipe-IT: Stored XSS via Inline XML Rendering in the Uploaded Files API
Medium Also affects snipe/snipe-it
GHSA-p9h3-gvpq-5539
Snipe-IT: Stored XSS via Custom Field name in asset-list column headers
High Also affects snipe/snipe-it
GHSA-hxcx-9h4f-42xx
Snipe-IT: 2FA bypass via the API token flow
High Also affects snipe/snipe-it
GHSA-c8qc-wf67-342w
Snipe-IT: Stored DOM XSS via table selected-count IDs
Medium Also affects snipe/snipe-it
GHSA-3hgv-jr5j-cg9x
Snipe-IT: Chained Information Disclosure and IDOR Leads to Full EULA File Takeover
Medium Also affects snipe/snipe-it
GHSA-c6w2-j4wq-mvwg
Snipe-IT: Tenant Isolation Bypass in FMCS Floater Mode
High Also affects snipe/snipe-it
GHSA-35cr-9hqq-p2mg
Snipe-IT: Cross-company deletion of pending checkout acceptances via unscoped report endpoint
Medium Also affects snipe/snipe-it
GHSA-w7qw-5wfv-gwx9
Snipe-IT has CSS Injection via `header_color` Setting
Medium Also affects snipe/snipe-it
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