GHSA-qmgc-5h2g-mvrw CVE-2026-22701 PYSEC-2026-1374
filelock Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Symlink Vulnerability in SoftFileLock
- Severity
- 5.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.13%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 2.31% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
- CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
- CWE-59 Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
- Fix
3.20.3- Upgrade filelock to this version or later
Description
Vulnerability Summary
Title: Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Symlink Vulnerability in SoftFileLock
Affected Component: filelock package - SoftFileLock class
File: src/filelock/_soft.py lines 17-27
CWE: CWE-362, CWE-367, CWE-59
Description
A TOCTOU race condition vulnerability exists in the SoftFileLock implementation of the filelock package. An attacker with local filesystem access and permission to create symlinks can exploit a race condition between the permission validation and file creation to cause lock operations to fail or behave unexpectedly.
The vulnerability occurs in the _acquire() method between raise_on_not_writable_file() (permission check) and os.open() (file creation). During this race window, an attacker can create a symlink at the lock file path, potentially causing the lock to operate on an unintended target file or leading to denial of service.
Attack Scenario
1. Lock attempts to acquire on /tmp/app.lock
2. Permission validation passes
3. [RACE WINDOW] - Attacker creates: ln -s /tmp/important.txt /tmp/app.lock
4. os.open() tries to create lock file
5. Lock operates on attacker-controlled target file or fails
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
This is a Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition vulnerability affecting any application using SoftFileLock for inter-process synchronization.
Affected Users:
- Applications using
filelock.SoftFileLockdirectly - Applications using the fallback
FileLockon systems withoutfcntlsupport (e.g., GraalPy)
Consequences:
- Silent lock acquisition failure - applications may not detect that exclusive resource access is not guaranteed
- Denial of Service - attacker can prevent lock file creation by maintaining symlink
- Resource serialization failures - multiple processes may acquire "locks" simultaneously
- Unintended file operations - lock could operate on attacker-controlled files
CVSS v4.0 Score: 5.6 (Medium) Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AT:L/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Attack Requirements:
- Local filesystem access to the directory containing lock files
- Permission to create symlinks (standard for regular unprivileged users on Unix/Linux)
- Ability to time the symlink creation during the narrow race window
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Yes, the vulnerability has been patched by adding the O_NOFOLLOW flag to prevent symlink following during lock file creation.
Patched Version: Next release (commit: 255ed068bc85d1ef406e50a135e1459170dd1bf0)
Mitigation Details:
- The
O_NOFOLLOWflag is added conditionally and gracefully degrades on platforms without support - On platforms with
O_NOFOLLOWsupport (most modern systems): symlink attacks are completely prevented - On platforms without
O_NOFOLLOW(e.g., GraalPy): TOCTOU window remains but is documented
Users should:
- Upgrade to the patched version when available
- For critical deployments, consider using
UnixFileLockorWindowsFileLockinstead of the fallbackSoftFileLock
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
For users unable to update immediately:
-
Avoid
SoftFileLockin security-sensitive contexts - useUnixFileLockorWindowsFileLockwhen available (these were already patched for CVE-2025-68146) -
Restrict filesystem permissions - prevent untrusted users from creating symlinks in lock file directories:
chmod 700 /path/to/lock/directory -
Use process isolation - isolate untrusted code from lock file paths to prevent symlink creation
-
Monitor lock operations - implement application-level checks to verify lock acquisitions are successful before proceeding with critical operations
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
- Similar Vulnerability: CVE-2025-68146 (TOCTOU vulnerability in UnixFileLock/WindowsFileLock)
- CWE-362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html
- CWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use Race Condition): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/367.html
- CWE-59 (Improper Link Resolution Before File Access): https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/59.html
- O_NOFOLLOW documentation: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html
- GitHub Repository: https://github.com/tox-dev/filelock
Reported by: George Tsigourakos (@tsigouris007)
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| filelock | < 3.20.3 |
3.20.3 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
filelock PyPI → 3.20.3
- pip
pip install --upgrade "filelock>=3.20.3"- poetry
poetry add "filelock>=3.20.3"- uv
uv add "filelock>=3.20.3"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
- Architecture and Design: Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
- Architecture and Design: Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring. Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
- Implementation: When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
- Implementation: Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
- Implementation: Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
- Implementation: Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
- Implementation: Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
- Implementation: Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and identity cannot be assured, but it does help to limit the false sense of security given by the check.
- Implementation: When the file being altered is owned by the current user and group, set the effective gid and uid to that of the current user and group when executing this statement.
- Architecture and Design: Limit the interleaving of operations on files from multiple processes.
- Implementation, Architecture and Design: If you cannot perform operations atomically and you must share access to the resource between multiple processes or threads, then try to limit the amount of time (CPU cycles) between the check and use of the resource. This will not fix the problem, but it could make it more difficult for an attack to succeed.
- Implementation: Recheck the resource after the use call to verify that the action was taken appropriately.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that some environmental locking mechanism can be used to protect resources effectively.
- Implementation: Ensure that locking occurs before the check, as opposed to afterwards, such that the resource, as checked, is the same as it is when in use.
CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system. Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-wfhq-q4j2-c37m filelock: SoftReadWriteLock follows a lock tree swapped in after its first acquire and writes lock records into directories of the user running the lock | Low | Also affects filelock |
| GHSA-6627-m3xw-93mp filelock: StrictSoftFileLock creates its claim directories without the lock mode, so another local user with a write bit on them can end a live hold | Medium | Also affects filelock |
| GHSA-9c4x-gm8v-wgc4 filelock: StrictSoftFileLock and SoftReadWriteLock adopt a protocol directory another user created first, losing mutual exclusion | Medium | Also affects filelock |
| GHSA-8mx5-7m5m-r77g filelock: WindowsFileLock ignores mode: a 0o600 lock file and the ReadWriteLock database inherit the directory ACL | Medium | Also affects filelock |
| GHSA-cwqr-hh33-gh44 filelock ReadWriteLock: a crafted lock database makes every acquire stall or hang regardless of timeout | Medium | Also affects filelock |
| GHSA-rfpc-qcw5-3pc4 filelock: SoftFileLock removes a live holder's marker when another user forges the PID in a writable marker | Medium | Also affects filelock |
| GHSA-9j6q-wvj5-jgjg filelock: Symlink swap during SoftFileLock's writability check leaks whether a path exists and is writable by the lock taker | Low | Also affects filelock |
| GHSA-69hj-f68j-2879 filelock: UnixFileLock truncates and chmods any regular file another user renames or hard-links onto the lock path | Medium | Also affects filelock |
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