GHSA-qcr3-hr2f-6557 CVE-2022-22941 PYSEC-2022-174

SaltStack Salt Permissions Bypass

High PyPI

Severity: 8.8 / 10; High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 1.34%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 71.31% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
Fix: 3002.8; Upgrade salt to this version or later

Description

An issue was discovered in SaltStack Salt in versions before 3002.8, 3003.4, 3004.1. When configured as a Master-of-Masters, with a publisher_acl, if a user configured in the publisher_acl targets any minion connected to the Syndic, the Salt Master incorrectly interpreted no valid targets as valid, allowing configured users to target any of the minions connected to the syndic with their configured commands. This requires a syndic master combined with publisher_acl configured on the Master-of-Masters, allowing users specified in the publisher_acl to bypass permissions, publishing authorized commands to any configured minion.

Affected versions

PyPI

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
salt	`< 3002.8`	`3002.8`
salt	`>= 3003, < 3003.4`	`3003.4`
salt	`>= 3004, < 3004.1`	`3004.1`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

salt PyPI → `3002.8`

pip

pip install --upgrade "salt>=3002.8"

poetry

poetry add "salt>=3002.8"

uv

uv add "salt>=3002.8"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: High
Availability: High

Weakness

CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource

The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.

How to prevent it

Implementation: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Implementation, Installation: During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
System Configuration: For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
Documentation: Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
Installation: Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
Operation, System Configuration: Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.

References

Advisories

Packages

github.com/saltstack/salt

Timeline

Mar 29, 2022 Published
Jun 10, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
CVE-2020-16846 SaltStack Salt Command Injection in netapi ssh client	Critical Known exploited	Also affects salt
CVE-2020-11652 SaltStack Salt is vulnerable Arbitrary Directory Access	High Known exploited	Also affects salt
CVE-2020-11651 SaltStack Salt Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution	Critical Known exploited	Also affects salt
GHSA-vcf3-26xf-fw4m Salt Authentication Protocol Version Downgrade Allows Minion Impersonation	Medium	Also affects salt
GHSA-77w2-v593-vxvv Salt junos Module Vulnerable to Code Injection via Specially Crafted YAML Payload	High	Also affects salt
GHSA-8pcp-r83j-fc92 Salt vulnerable to directory traversal attack in file receiving method	High	Also affects salt
GHSA-989c-m532-p2hv Salt's worker process vulnerable to denial of service through file read operation	Medium	Also affects salt
GHSA-7f3f-x5f5-79gw Salt's file contents overwrite the VirtKey class	Medium	Also affects salt

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