GHSA-qc2q-p7wx-3px3 CVE-2026-84303 GO-2026-6441
gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC HTTP Filter bypass via mixed-case Header Matching and gRFC A41 validation evasion
- Severity
- 6.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.31%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 24.00% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
1.83.1- Upgrade google.golang.org/grpc to this version or later
Description
Summary
A vulnerability in the xDS RBAC HTTP filter implementation in grpc-go allows remote attackers to bypass authorization policies (specifically DENY rules) by using mixed-case or canonical-case header matchers (e.g., X-Role instead of x-role). Additionally, the safety guards introduced by gRFC A41 to block grpc- prefixed headers can be evaded via variations in casing (e.g., Grpc-Status).
Impact
When an operator defines an RBAC policy referencing headers containing uppercase letters (e.g. X-Role), grpc-go fails to match incoming metadata keys because they are unconditionally lowercased. Because of this case-sensitivity mismatch, a policy designed to block requests containing specific header values fails open: the rule is evaluated as a non-match, and traffic that should have been rejected is served.
Furthermore, gRFC A41 requires rejecting configuration schemas specifying header matchers starting with grpc-. Because this check is executed case-sensitively in grpc-go, attackers can bypass the validation by specifying titles like Grpc-Status.
Patches
The problem is fixed in master and in the 1.83.1 release.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| google.golang.org/grpc | <= 1.83.0 |
No fix yet |
| google.golang.org/grpc | < 1.83.1 |
1.83.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
google.golang.org/grpc Go → 1.83.1
- go
go get google.golang.org/grpc@v1.83.1 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 6.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-178: Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity
The product does not properly account for differences in case sensitivity when accessing or determining the properties of a resource, leading to inconsistent results.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Avoid making decisions based on names of resources (e.g. files) if those resources can have alternate names.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-m425-mq94-257g gRPC-Go HTTP/2 Rapid Reset vulnerability | High Known exploited | Also affects google.golang.org/grpc |
| GHSA-2v4p-qf9q-27wj gRPC-Go xDS servers: Denial of Service (DoS) via crash due to missing `:authority` and `Host` headers | High | Also affects google.golang.org/grpc |
| GHSA-vp52-pcj8-j9qc gRPC-Go: Heap Memory Exhaustion (OOM) via HTTP/2 DATA Frame Fragmentation | High | Also affects google.golang.org/grpc |
| GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities | High | Also affects google.golang.org/grpc |
| GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3 gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path | Critical | Also affects google.golang.org/grpc |
| GHSA-xr7q-jx4m-x55m Private tokens could appear in logs if context containing gRPC metadata is logged in github.com/grpc/grpc-go | Low | Also affects google.golang.org/grpc |
| GHSA-vjh5-4x84-xrqp Nuxt: Server-side route rules (`redirect`, `headers`, `proxy`, `ssr`) are skipped for case-variant paths when routing is case-insensitive | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-178 |
| GHSA-f72v-6w45-q472 undici vulnerable to Subresource Integrity bypass via non-lowercase algorithm tokens | High | Same weakness, CWE-178 |
Credits: alimony
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