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GHSA-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3 CVE-2026-50021

pnpm Has an Integrity Check Bypass via Missing Lockfile Integrity Field

High npm
Severity
6.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.18%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 7.67% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
Fix
11.4.0
Upgrade pnpm to this version or later

Description

Summary

pnpm's tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the integrity field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify pnpm-lock.yaml to remove the integrity: field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, pnpm install --frozen-lockfile can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm's npm ci enforces integrity by default; pnpm's behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specific fail-open gap.

Vulnerability Details

The addTarballToStore function in worker/src/start.ts (lines 189-204) checks if (integrity) before verifying the tarball hash. The TarballResolution type declares integrity as optional (integrity?: string). When the lockfile omits the integrity field, the guard evaluates to false, skipping hash verification entirely. The worker then computes a new hash from the unverified content and stores it as legitimate.

// worker/src/start.ts:189-204
function addTarballToStore ({ buffer, storeDir, integrity, ... }: TarballExtractMessage) {
  if (integrity) {           // false when integrity is undefined
    const { algorithm, hexDigest } = parseIntegrity(integrity)
    const calculatedHash = crypto.hash(algorithm, buffer, 'hex')
    if (calculatedHash !== hexDigest) {
      return { status: 'error', error: { type: 'integrity_validation_failed', ... } }
    }
  }
  return {
    status: 'success',
    value: { integrity: integrity ?? calcIntegrity(buffer) },
  }
}

Proof of Concept

bash autofyn_audit/exploits/vuln1_integrity_bypass/exploit.sh
# Publishes a package, generates lockfile, republishes tampered version,
# strips integrity field, re-runs install --frozen-lockfile.
# Result: PASS -- tampered package installed without integrity error.

Impact

Supply chain compromise in environments where an attacker can both alter the lockfile and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content. The --frozen-lockfile flag does not fail closed when the integrity field is missing.

Suggested Remediation

Require an integrity field for remote tarball resolutions. Change the if (integrity) guard to fail when integrity is absent for non-local packages. When --frozen-lockfile is active, reject lockfile entries that lack integrity for remote packages.


Discovered by AutoFyn Full audit report: audit_report.md Exploit script: exploit.sh

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
pnpm
>= 11.0.0, < 11.4.0
11.4.0
pnpm
< 10.34.1
10.34.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

pnpm npm → 11.4.0

npm
npm install pnpm@11.4.0
yarn
yarn add pnpm@11.4.0
pnpm
pnpm add pnpm@11.4.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-354: Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value

The product does not validate or incorrectly validates the integrity check values or "checksums" of a message. This may prevent it from detecting if the data has been modified or corrupted in transmission.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Ensure that the checksums present in messages are properly checked in accordance with the protocol specification before they are parsed and used.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-vx52-2968-3vc6
pnpm: Environment secrets exfiltrated via env-placeholder expansion in proxy settings read from an untrusted pnpm-workspace.yaml
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-2rx9-3g3h-c2jv
pnpm: pacquet trust-lockfile install can create dependency symlinks outside the project
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m
pnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-c59q-g84q-2gj5
pnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-qrv3-253h-g69c
pnpm: Path traversal in configDependencies env lockfile allows symlink creation outside node_modules/.pnpm-config
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-72r4-9c5j-mj57
pnpm: `patch-remove` could delete project-selected files outside the patches directory
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv
pnpm: Hoisted install imports lockfile alias outside node_modules
High Also affects pnpm
GHSA-v23m-ccfg-pq9h
pnpm: `stage download` writes outside its destination directory via manifest name/version traversal
High Also affects pnpm
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