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GHSA-q4qf-9j86-f5mh CVE-2026-34786

Rack:: Static header_rules bypass via URL-encoded paths

Medium RubyGems
Severity
5.3 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.20%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 10.21% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-180 Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize
Fix
2.2.23
Upgrade rack to this version or later

Description

Summary

Rack::Static#applicable_rules evaluates several header_rules types against the raw URL-encoded PATH_INFO, while the underlying file-serving path is decoded before the file is served. As a result, a request for a URL-encoded variant of a static path can serve the same file without the headers that header_rules were intended to apply.

In deployments that rely on Rack::Static to attach security-relevant response headers to static content, this can allow an attacker to bypass those headers by requesting an encoded form of the path.

Details

Rack::Static#applicable_rules matches rule types such as :fonts, Array, and Regexp directly against the incoming PATH_INFO. For example:

when :fonts
  /\.(?:ttf|otf|eot|woff2|woff|svg)\z/.match?(path)
when Array
  /\.(#{rule.join('|')})\z/.match?(path)
when Regexp
  rule.match?(path)

These checks operate on the raw request path. If the request contains encoded characters such as %2E in place of ., the rule may fail to match even though the file path is later decoded and served successfully by the static file server.

For example, both of the following requests may resolve to the same file on disk:

/fonts/test.woff
/fonts/test%2Ewoff

but only the unencoded form may receive the headers configured through header_rules.

This creates a canonicalization mismatch between the path used for header policy decisions and the path ultimately used for file serving.

Impact

Applications that rely on Rack::Static header_rules to apply security-relevant headers to static files may be affected.

In affected deployments, an attacker can request an encoded variant of a static file path and receive the same file without the intended headers. Depending on how header_rules are used, this may bypass protections such as clickjacking defenses, content restrictions, or other response policies applied to static content.

The practical impact depends on the configured rules and the types of files being served. If header_rules are only used for non-security purposes such as caching, the issue may have limited security significance.

Mitigation

  • Update to a patched version of Rack that applies header_rules to a decoded path consistently with static file resolution.
  • Do not rely solely on Rack::Static header_rules for security-critical headers where encoded path variants may reach the application.
  • Prefer setting security headers at the reverse proxy or web server layer so they apply consistently to both encoded and unencoded path forms.
  • Normalize or reject encoded path variants for static content at the edge, where feasible.

Affected versions

RubyGems

PackageVulnerableFixed in
rack
< 2.2.23
2.2.23
rack
>= 3.0.0.beta1, < 3.1.21
3.1.21
rack
>= 3.2.0, < 3.2.6
3.2.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

rack RubyGems → 2.2.23

bundler
bundle update rack # Gemfile: gem "rack", ">= 2.2.23"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.3

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-180: Incorrect Behavior Order: Validate Before Canonicalize

The product validates input before it is canonicalized, which prevents the product from detecting data that becomes invalid after the canonicalization step.

How to prevent it
  • Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
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