GHSA-q453-638c-h4mr CVE-2025-49222 GO-2025-3904
Mattermost Fails to Validate Remote Cluster Upload Sessions
Medium
Go
- Severity
- 6.8 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.30%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 22.90% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-434 Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Mattermost versions 10.8.x <= 10.8.3, 10.5.x <= 10.5.8, 9.11.x <= 9.11.17, 10.9.x <= 10.9.2, 10.10.x <= 10.10.0 fail to validate upload types in remote cluster upload sessions which allows a system admin to upload non-attachment file types via shared channels that could potentially be placed in arbitrary filesystem directories.
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server | >= 10.8.0, < 10.8.4 |
10.8.4 |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server | >= 10.5.0, < 10.5.9 |
10.5.9 |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server | >= 9.11.0, < 9.11.18 |
9.11.18 |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server | >= 10.9.0, < 10.9.3 |
10.9.3 |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server | >= 10.10.0, < 10.10.1 |
10.10.1 |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server | >= 9.11.0+incompatible, < 9.11.18+incompatible>= 10.5.0+incompatible, < 10.5.9+incompatible>= 10.8.0+incompatible, < 10.8.4+incompatible>= 10.9.0+incompatible, < 10.9.3+incompatible>= 10.10.0+incompatible, < 10.10.1+incompatible |
9.11.18+incompatible10.5.9+incompatible10.8.4+incompatible10.9.3+incompatible10.10.1+incompatible |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v5 | <= 5.39.3 |
No fix yet |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v5 | all versions |
No fix yet |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v6 | <= 5.7.2 |
No fix yet |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v6 | all versions |
No fix yet |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8 | < 8.0.0-20250708173752-d6b35c41f0ae5 |
8.0.0-20250708173752-d6b35c41f0ae5 |
| github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8 | all versions |
No fix yet |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server Go → 10.8.4
- go
go get github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server@v10.8.4 && go mod tidy
github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8 Go → 8.0.0-20250708173752-d6b35c41f0ae5
- go
go get github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8@v8.0.0-20250708173752-d6b35c41f0ae5 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.[REF-422] [REF-423]
- Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- Architecture and Design: Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically. [REF-423]
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.
- Architecture and Design: Define a very limited set of allowable extensions and only generate filenames that end in these extensions. Consider the possibility of XSS (CWE-79) before allowing .html or .htm file types.
- Implementation: Ensure that only one extension is used in the filename. Some web servers, including some versions of Apache, may process files based on inner extensions so that "filename.php.gif" is fed to the PHP interpreter.[REF-422] [REF-423]
- Implementation: When running on a web server that supports case-insensitive filenames, perform case-insensitive evaluations of the extensions that are provided.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on sanity checks of file contents to ensure that the file is of the expected type and size. It may be possible for an attacker to hide code in some file segments that will still be executed by the server. For example, GIF images may contain a free-form comments field.
- Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on the MIME content type or filename attribute when determining how to render a file. Validating the MIME content type and ensuring that it matches the extension is only a partial solution.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-xmfh-3ccg-c9fx Mattermost has an Incorrect Authorization issue | Low | Also affects github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server |
| GHSA-h998-hxxj-8q83 Mattermost doesn't invalidate cached authentication state for active WebSocket connections during global session revocation | Medium | Also affects github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server |
| GHSA-g5vr-6pgg-74qv Mattermost doesn't enforce bot-specific permission checks on the user active status endpoint | Low | Also affects github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server |
| GHSA-jqgv-39mg-7c2r Mattermost doesn't authenticate Atlassian Connect installed callbacks, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to inject a rogue sharedSecret | Medium | Also affects github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server |
| GHSA-mxq2-5jpg-7474 Mattermost doesn't validate channel ownership of an existing subscription before applying edits | Medium | Also affects github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server |
| GHSA-2g8v-grq3-hq2g Mattermost doesn't enforce administrator authorization on the {{setDefaultInstance}} call within the {{/gitlab connect}} command handler | Medium | Also affects github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server |
| GHSA-6hxm-w4hv-vgvw Mattermost doesn't require role-management authorization when setting the scheme_admin flag on group syncable link and patch endpoints | High | Also affects github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server |
| GHSA-9p44-r552-4wp9 Mattermost doesn't sanitize the Remote Cluster API response on PATCH operations | Medium | Also affects github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server |
MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.
Check your repos with MergeHarbor