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GHSA-pv2v-6w2v-97x6 CVE-2026-8135

Concrete CMS Vulnerable to Deserialization of Untrusted Data

High Packagist
Severity
0.0 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.47%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 40.71% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
9.5.1
Upgrade concrete5/concrete5 to this version or later

Description

Concrete CMS 9.5.0 and below is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution due to insecure deserialization occurring in the ExpressEntryList block controller. An rogue administrator with privileges to add blocks to an area can bypass the intended protection mechanism (_fromCIF === true), which normally restricts malicious inputs over form POST requests, by leveraging the REST API functionality. Because the REST API parses requests using json_decode(), the string "true" is evaluated as a strict PHP Boolean(true).  This bypass allows the attacker to inject a malicious serialized payload  into the block's filterFields database column. The payload will subsequently be executed when the block's data is viewed or edited by an administrator leading to complete server takeover (RCE). Concrete CMS thanks Nguyễn Văn Thiện https://github.com/Thien225409  for reporting this issue.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
concrete5/concrete5
< 9.5.1
9.5.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

concrete5/concrete5 Packagist → 9.5.1

composer
composer require concrete5/concrete5:^9.5.1

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Attack requirements
Present
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
High
Integrity (subsequent systems)
High
Availability (subsequent systems)
High

CVSS 3.1 7.2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-g82f-9pw7-773w
Concrete CMS: PHP Object Injection via unserialize() calls
High Also affects concrete5/concrete5
GHSA-52pr-7vmf-2w7x
Concrete CMS is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection via unserialize() calls in the Workflow, Form block, and File/Set components
High Also affects concrete5/concrete5
GHSA-q9fm-mpg8-8jqm
Concrete CMS is vulnerable to Stored XSS via page name in the Atomik theme
Medium Also affects concrete5/concrete5
GHSA-jqvq-gv67-3567
Concrete CMS is vulnerable to IDOR + wrong-authorization-level in the Express association Reorder dialog
Medium Also affects concrete5/concrete5
GHSA-xjg6-5v39-v7fc
Concrete CMS is vulnerable to CSRF via Backend\File::approveVersion
Medium Also affects concrete5/concrete5
GHSA-44q4-354f-c826
Concrete CMS is vulnerable to Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) at concrete/controllers/backend/file approveVersion()
Medium Also affects concrete5/concrete5
GHSA-6qjh-p324-694f
Concrete CMS is vulnerable to Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) at concrete/controllers/backend/file rescanMultiple()
High Also affects concrete5/concrete5
GHSA-6fxm-r8p3-mx5c
Concrete CMS is vulnerable to Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) at concrete/controllers/backend/file rescan()
High Also affects concrete5/concrete5
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