GHSA-pg57-6jwg-q645 CVE-2026-53493 GO-2026-6597

Containerd has image-pull DoS via crafted OCI index graph amplification

Medium Go

Severity: 0.0 / 10; Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.36%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 29.38% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption; CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling; CWE-834 Excessive Iteration
Fix: Available; 2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Impact

A vulnerability exists in containerd's image pull handlers where a crafted OCI image index containing deeply nested or heavily fanned-out descriptor graphs can cause unbounded CPU and memory consumption. During the PullImage operation, the recursive traversal and processing of child descriptors lack sufficient depth and breadth limits, and fail to adequately deduplicate identical descriptors. This unbounded traversal leads to excessive resource allocation.

Consequently, pulling a malicious image reference can result in prolonged stalls during container creation and significant resource pressure on the host system. This issue occurs entirely during the image pull phase, prior to any container execution.

Patches

This bug has been fixed in containerd 2.4.1, 2.3.6, 2.2.9, 2.0.13, and 1.7.36. Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue.

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds for this issue. Users are advised to only pull trusted images from known registries until the patch can be applied.

Credits

The containerd project would like to thank Jakub Ciolek at ElevenLabs and @jlgore who independently discovered and responsibly disclosed this issue in accordance with the containerd security policy.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in containerd
Email us at security@containerd.io

To report a security issue in containerd:

Report a new vulnerability
Email us at security@containerd.io

Affected versions

Go

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
github.com/containerd/containerd	`< 1.7.36`	`1.7.36`
github.com/containerd/containerd/v2	`>= 2.0.0, < 2.0.13`	`2.0.13`
github.com/containerd/containerd/v2	`>= 2.1.0, < 2.2.9`	`2.2.9`
github.com/containerd/containerd/v2	`>= 2.3.0, < 2.3.6`	`2.3.6`
github.com/containerd/containerd/v2	`>= 2.4.0, < 2.4.1`	`2.4.1`
github.com/containerd/containerd/v2	`>= 2.0.0, < 2.0.13` `>= 2.1.0, < 2.2.9` `>= 2.3.0, < 2.3.6` `>= 2.4.0, < 2.4.1`	`2.0.13` `2.2.9` `2.3.6` `2.4.1`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/containerd/containerd Go → `1.7.36`

go

go get github.com/containerd/containerd@v1.7.36 && go mod tidy

github.com/containerd/containerd/v2 Go → `2.0.13`

go

go get github.com/containerd/containerd/v2@v2.0.13 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Attack requirements: None
Privileges required: None
User interaction: None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system): None
Integrity (vulnerable system): None
Availability (vulnerable system): Low
Confidentiality (subsequent systems): None
Integrity (subsequent systems): None
Availability (subsequent systems): None

Weakness

CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.

How to prevent it

Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).

CWE-834: Excessive Iteration

The product performs an iteration or loop without sufficiently limiting the number of times that the loop is executed.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53493

Packages

github.com/containerd/containerd

Timeline

Sep 25, 2026 Published
Oct 1, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-rp3h-jf77-q9p4 containerd: Unpack DoS via repeated opaque whiteouts	Medium	Also affects github.com/containerd/containerd
GO-2026-6791 containerd CRI plugin: Checkpoint restore bypasses destination security context	High	Also affects github.com/containerd/containerd
GHSA-7jxh-36q5-gcqv containerd: CRI ExecSync Goroutine Leak Leads to Node-Level Denial of Service	Medium	Also affects github.com/containerd/containerd
GO-2026-5064 containerd CRI checkpoint restore CDI annotation smuggling	Critical	Also affects github.com/containerd/containerd
GO-2026-5622 Arbitrary host CRI log file read via symlink following in CRI checkpoint restore	Medium	Also affects github.com/containerd/containerd
GHSA-xhf5-7wjv-pqxp containerd CRI — image-config `LABEL` flows to restart-monitor `binary://` logger: host-root command execution from an image pull	High	Also affects github.com/containerd/containerd
GO-2026-5338 containerd: CRI checkpoint import allows local image tag poisoning	Critical	Also affects github.com/containerd/containerd
GHSA-jpcc-p29g-p8mq containerd image-triggered runtime DoS via unbounded group parsing	Medium	Also affects github.com/containerd/containerd

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