GHSA-p7v2-p9m8-qqg7 CVE-2023-29198

Electron context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value

High npm

Severity: 6.0 / 10; High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.59%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 48.22% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-754 Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
Fix: 22.3.6; Upgrade electron to this version or later

Description

Impact

Apps using contextIsolation and contextBridge are affected.

This is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.

Workarounds

This issue is exploitable under either of two conditions:

If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown Error: object could not be cloned.
If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed.

The app side workaround is to ensure that such a case is not possible. Ensure all values returned from a function exposed over the context bridge are supported and that any objects returned from functions do not have dynamic getters that can throw exceptions.

Auditing your exposed API is likely to be quite difficult so we strongly recommend you update to a patched version of Electron.

Fixed Versions

25.0.0-alpha.2
24.0.1
23.2.3
22.3.6

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org

Affected versions

npm

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
electron	`< 22.3.6`	`22.3.6`
electron	`>= 23.0.0-alpha.1, < 23.2.3`	`23.2.3`
electron	`>= 24.0.0-alpha.1, < 24.0.1`	`24.0.1`
electron	`>= 25.0.0-alpha.1, < 25.0.0-alpha.2`	`25.0.0-alpha.2`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

electron npm → `22.3.6`

npm

npm install electron@22.3.6

yarn

yarn add electron@22.3.6

pnpm

pnpm add electron@22.3.6

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: High
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: Low
Availability: Low

Weakness

CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions

The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.

How to prevent it

Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. Choose languages with features such as exception handling that force the programmer to anticipate unusual conditions that may generate exceptions. Custom exceptions may need to be developed to handle unusual business-logic conditions. Be careful not to pass sensitive exceptions back to the user (CWE-209, CWE-248).
Implementation: Check the results of all functions that return a value and verify that the value is expected.
Implementation: If using exception handling, catch and throw specific exceptions instead of overly-general exceptions (CWE-396, CWE-397). Catch and handle exceptions as locally as possible so that exceptions do not propagate too far up the call stack (CWE-705). Avoid unchecked or uncaught exceptions where feasible (CWE-248).
Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. Exposing additional information to a potential attacker in the context of an exceptional condition can help the attacker determine what attack vectors are most likely to succeed beyond DoS.
Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
Architecture and Design: Use system limits, which should help to prevent resource exhaustion. However, the product should still handle low resource conditions since they may still occur.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29198

Packages

github.com/electron/electron

Timeline

Sep 6, 2023 Published
Sep 10, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-qqvq-6xgj-jw8g Electron affected by libvpx's heap buffer overflow in vp8 encoding	High Known exploited	Also affects electron
GHSA-j7hp-h8jx-5ppr libwebp: OOB write in BuildHuffmanTable	High Known exploited	Also affects electron
GHSA-995f-9x5r-2rcj Heap buffer overflow in GPU	Critical Known exploited	Also affects electron
GHSA-jr5w-w6x2-84p9 Electron: Mitigation for compromised eMudhra intermediate certificates	High	Also affects electron
GHSA-h3v5-h239-pg29 Electron: Off-screen rendering on macOS trusts GPU-supplied frame geometry	Low	Also affects electron
GHSA-3qxv-5xgr-q7w9 Electron: Frame subscription trusts GPU-supplied frame geometry	Low	Also affects electron
GHSA-997q-gvvc-jwmx Electron: openExternal permission requests can be attributed to the wrong origin	Medium	Also affects electron
GHSA-fw47-9c62-h3vw Electron: HID and USB permission checks can be attributed to the wrong origin	Medium	Also affects electron

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