Skip to content

GHSA-p5vx-9hj8-cf4h CVE-2024-7035 PYSEC-2026-1739

Open WebUI Vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Medium PyPI
Severity
6.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
8.67%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 95.12% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Fix
0.3.16
Upgrade open-webui to this version or later

Description

In version v0.3.8 of open-webui/open-webui, sensitive actions such as deleting and resetting are performed using the GET method. This vulnerability allows an attacker to perform Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks, where an unaware user can unintentionally perform sensitive actions by simply visiting a malicious site or through top-level navigation. The affected endpoints include /rag/api/v1/reset, /rag/api/v1/reset/db, /api/v1/memories/reset, and /rag/api/v1/reset/uploads. This impacts both the availability and integrity of the application.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
open-webui
<= 0.3.8
No fix yet
open-webui
< 0.3.16
0.3.16

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

open-webui PyPI → 0.3.16

pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.3.16"
poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.3.16"
uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.3.16"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 6.9

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

Weakness

CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330] Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
  • Implementation: Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
  • Architecture and Design: Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
  • Architecture and Design: Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
  • Architecture and Design: Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller: When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult. This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
  • Architecture and Design: Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
  • Implementation: Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-wvm9-9g5j-623f
Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-4qg5-cxx4-g927
Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-jqhh-cjmq-vmv6
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-5x7x-4c3c-qf5w
Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree
Medium Also affects open-webui
GHSA-34r3-9m95-vq73
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach the Azure platform channel via server-side web fetch
High Also affects open-webui
GHSA-2724-6cpj-gf3v
Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion
High Also affects open-webui
GHSA-3pf7-q2g3-wj28
Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions
Medium Also affects open-webui
Is this in your code?

MergeHarbor checks every repository's dependencies against this database, ranks what matters by exploitability and reachability, routes it to the owning team and opens the fix pull request.

Check your repos with MergeHarbor