GHSA-p4wh-cr8m-gm6c CVE-2026-22217
OpenClaw: shell-env trusted-prefix fallback allowed attacker-controlled binary execution via $SHELL
Medium
npm
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.13%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 2.59% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
- CWE-829 Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
- Fix
2026.2.23- Upgrade openclaw to this version or later
Description
Summary
shell-env fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for $SHELL, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios.
Details
In affected versions, shell selection accepted either:
- a shell listed in
/etc/shells, or - any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (
/bin,/usr/bin,/usr/local/bin,/opt/homebrew/bin,/run/current-system/sw/bin).
The selected shell was then executed as a login shell (-l -c 'env -0') for PATH/environment probing.
On systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under /opt/homebrew/bin) and runtime $SHELL can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context.
The fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in /etc/shells; otherwise it falls back to /bin/sh.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
>= 2026.2.22, <= 2026.2.22-2 - Latest published vulnerable version:
2026.2.22-2 - Patched versions (released):
>= 2026.2.23
Fix Commit(s)
ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55
Release Process Note
This advisory sets patched_versions to the released version (2026.2.23).
This advisory now reflects released fix version 2026.2.23.
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| openclaw | >= 2026.2.22, < 2026.2.23 |
2026.2.23 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
openclaw npm → 2026.2.23
- npm
npm install openclaw@2026.2.23- yarn
yarn add openclaw@2026.2.23- pnpm
pnpm add openclaw@2026.2.23
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- High
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 6.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
Weakness
CWE-184: Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
The product implements a protection mechanism that relies on a list of inputs (or properties of inputs) that are not allowed by policy or otherwise require other action to neutralize before additional processing takes place, but the list is incomplete.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: Do not rely exclusively on detecting disallowed inputs. There are too many variants to encode a character, especially when different environments are used, so there is a high likelihood of missing some variants. Only use detection of disallowed inputs as a mechanism for detecting suspicious activity. Ensure that you are using other protection mechanisms that only identify "good" input - such as lists of allowed inputs - and ensure that you are properly encoding your outputs.
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
The product imports, requires, or includes executable functionality (such as a library) from a source that is outside of the intended control sphere.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls. Many file inclusion problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, especially for cookies and URL components.
- Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
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| GHSA-c226-q6fx-6j6c OpenClaw: macOS Swift exec allowlist missed combined POSIX inline flags | Medium | Also affects openclaw |
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