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GHSA-mr32-vwc2-5j6h CVE-2026-28458

OpenClaw's Browser Relay /cdp websocket is missing auth which could allow cross-tab cookie access

Medium npm
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.35%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 28.81% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Fix
2026.2.1
Upgrade openclaw to this version or later

Description

Summary

In affected versions, the Browser Relay /cdp WebSocket endpoint did not require an authentication token. As a result, a website running in the browser could potentially connect to the local relay (via loopback WebSocket) and use CDP to access cookies from other open tabs and run JavaScript in the context of other tabs.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • npm: openclaw >= 2026.1.20, < 2026.2.1
  • npm: moltbot <= 0.1.0

Details

The Chrome extension Browser Relay service exposes a local WebSocket endpoint at ws://127.0.0.1:18792/cdp (default port) for forwarding Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) messages.

In affected versions, the /cdp upgrade path verified the TCP peer was loopback but did not require a shared secret and did not block browser-initiated cross-origin requests.

Impact

  • Potential disclosure of sensitive information (for example, session cookies from other open tabs)
  • Potential JavaScript execution in the context of other open tabs

Users must have the Browser Relay extension installed and active, and must visit an untrusted site.

Fix

openclaw now requires a per-instance shared secret header for Browser Relay access:

  • HTTP header: x-openclaw-relay-token

It also rejects /cdp WebSocket upgrades when the Origin header is present but is not chrome-extension://..., and refuses /cdp connections unless the extension is connected.

Fix Commit(s)

  • a1e89afcc19efd641c02b24d66d689f181ae2b5c

Releases

  • openclaw@2026.2.1 includes the fix.
  • Latest published openclaw at time of writing: 2026.2.13.

Mitigation

  • Update to openclaw@>= 2026.2.1.
  • If you cannot update immediately, disable the Browser Relay extension / relay server and avoid visiting untrusted sites.

Thanks @johnatzeropath, @LeftenantZero, and @yueyueL for reporting.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
moltbot
<= 0.1.0
No fix yet
openclaw
>= 2026.1.20, < 2026.2.1
2026.2.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openclaw npm → 2026.2.1

npm
npm install openclaw@2026.2.1
yarn
yarn add openclaw@2026.2.1
pnpm
pnpm add openclaw@2026.2.1

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Passive
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
  • Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-3x84-qq85-fj65
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OpenClaw: Shell inline-command parsing could miss an allowlist check
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OpenClaw: Tool group policy callers could accept unvalidated group IDs
Medium Also affects openclaw
GHSA-9v8j-9c9g-w66c
OpenClaw: Bootstrap token replay could widen pending pairing scopes
Medium Also affects openclaw
GHSA-c226-q6fx-6j6c
OpenClaw: macOS Swift exec allowlist missed combined POSIX inline flags
Medium Also affects openclaw
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