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GHSA-mfhv-gwf8-4m88 CVE-2021-3597

undertow Race Condition vulnerability

Medium Maven
Severity
5.9 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.16%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 67.20% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Fix
2.2.9.Final
Upgrade io.undertow:undertow-core to this version or later

Description

A flaw was found in undertow. The HTTP2SourceChannel fails to write the final frame under some circumstances, resulting in a denial of service. The highest threat from this vulnerability is availability. This flaw affects Undertow versions prior to 2.0.35.SP1, prior to 2.2.6.SP1, prior to 2.2.7.SP1, prior to 2.0.36.SP1, prior to 2.2.9.Final and prior to 2.0.39.Final.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
io.undertow:undertow-core
>= 2.1.0, < 2.2.9.Final
2.2.9.Final
io.undertow:undertow-core
< 2.0.39.Final
2.0.39.Final

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

io.undertow:undertow-core Maven → 2.2.9.Final

maven
<dependency><groupId>io.undertow</groupId><artifactId>undertow-core</artifactId><version>2.2.9.Final</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("io.undertow:undertow-core:2.2.9.Final")

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
  • Architecture and Design: Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
  • Architecture and Design: Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring. Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
  • Implementation: When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
  • Implementation: Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
  • Implementation: Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
  • Implementation: Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
  • Implementation: Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
  • Implementation: Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
  • Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-3x3v-w654-m28m
Undertow: Denial of Service via Multipart/Form-Data Parsing on HTTP GET Requests
Medium Also affects io.undertow:undertow-core
GHSA-33hj-rcmx-86mv
Undertow Servlets Vulnerable to Remote DoS via OutOfMemoryError when Passed Large Parameter Names
High Also affects io.undertow:undertow-core
GHSA-j382-5jj3-vw4j
Undertow HTTP server core doesn't properly validate the Host header in incoming HTTP requests
Critical Also affects io.undertow:undertow-core
GHSA-6h4f-pj3g-q8fq
Undertow OutOfMemory when parsing form data encoding with application/x-www-form-urlencoded
High Also affects io.undertow:undertow-core
GHSA-95h4-w6j8-2rp8
Undertow MadeYouReset HTTP/2 DDoS Vulnerability
High Also affects io.undertow:undertow-core
GHSA-3jrv-jgp8-45v3
Undertow incorrectly parses cookies
High Also affects io.undertow:undertow-core
GHSA-97cq-f4jm-mv8h
Undertow Denial of Service vulnerability
High Also affects io.undertow:undertow-core
GHSA-9623-mqmm-5rcf
Undertow vulnerable to Race Condition
High Also affects io.undertow:undertow-core
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