GHSA-j6r3-76f7-8jcv CVE-2026-101912
ip-address: isInSubnet() and isHostInSubnet() compare addresses of different families as if they shared an address space, allowing an allowlist check to admit an address outside its range
- Severity
- 6.3 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.37%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 31.00% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-697 Incorrect Comparison
- CWE-843 Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
- Fix
10.7.1- Upgrade ip-address to this version or later
Description
Summary
isInSubnet() and isHostInSubnet() accept an address of either family and compare masked binary strings without checking that both operands are the same family. Address4 pads to 32 bits and Address6 to 128, so whenever the leading bits agree the strings are equal: new Address6('a00::1').isInSubnet(new Address4('10.0.0.0/8')) is true, and new Address4('32.0.0.1').isInSubnet(new Address6('2000::/3')) is true. No IPv4 address is inside an IPv6 network, so both answers are untrue.
An application that parses untrusted input as whichever family accepts it and then tests the result against a fixed-family allowlist can admit an address outside the list.
Details
Both methods are in src/common.ts:
export function isInSubnet(this: Address4 | Address6, address: Address4 | Address6) {
if (this.subnetMask < address.subnetMask) {
return false;
}
return isHostInSubnet.call(this, address);
}
export function isHostInSubnet(this: Address4 | Address6, address: Address4 | Address6) {
return this.mask(address.subnetMask) === address.mask();
}
mask(n) returns the first n bits of the address as a string of 0 and 1, taken from a representation padded to the family's width. new Address6('a00::1').mask(8) is '00001010', and so is new Address4('10.0.0.0/8').mask(), so string equality reports containment. The signature admits either family on either side, so TypeScript raises nothing, and the v4 property on Address6 marks IPv4 notation (::ffff:10.0.0.1) rather than family, so it does not discriminate either.
Which cross-family pairs coincide depends on the network's prefix length. mask(n) on an Address4 returns at most 32 bits, so an IPv6 network longer than /32 never matches an IPv4 address, and an IPv6 network of /32 or shorter matches exactly the IPv4 addresses whose leading bits equal its prefix. An IPv4 network is at most 32 bits and matches every IPv6 address whose leading bits equal its prefix.
Affected versions
<= 10.7.0. The comparison has had this shape since the methods were written, so every release is affected.
Impact
| Expression | Result | Reason |
|---|---|---|
new Address6('a00::1').isInSubnet(new Address4('10.0.0.0/8')) |
true |
both mask to 00001010 |
new Address4('10.0.0.1').isInSubnet(new Address6('a00::/8')) |
true |
the same bits, reversed |
new Address4('32.0.0.1').isInSubnet(new Address6('2000::/3')) |
true |
both begin 001 |
new Address4('32.1.13.184').isInSubnet(new Address6('2001:db8::/32')) |
true |
the /32 spells an IPv4 address |
new Address6('cb00:7100::1').isInSubnet(new Address4('203.0.113.0/24')) |
true |
the /24 spells an IPv6 prefix |
new Address4('10.0.0.1').isInSubnet(new Address6('::ffff:10.0.0.0/104')) |
false |
/104 is longer than 32 bits |
new Address4('8.8.8.8').isInSubnet(new Address4('10.0.0.0/8')) |
false |
same-family control |
In the allowlist direction the check admits an address outside the list; in the denylist direction it blocks an address outside the list. What the coincidence can admit is narrow. An IPv6 allowlist of /32 or shorter admits the IPv4 addresses its prefix spells: 2001:db8::/32 admits exactly 32.1.13.184, and 2000::/3 admits 32.0.0.0/3. Those are public IPv4 addresses; the private, loopback, and link-local ranges begin with bit patterns no allocated IPv6 prefix shares. An IPv4 allowlist admits the IPv6 addresses its prefix spells, and those all sit in blocks IANA has not allocated. So a request admitted through this defect reaches an address outside the intended list, not an internal host, and the severity reflects that.
Proof of concept
npm i ip-address@10.7.0, then:
const { Address4, Address6 } = require('ip-address');
// An allowlist of the application's own IPv6 range, tested against whichever
// family the input parses as.
const allowed = new Address6('2001:db8::/32');
function parse(host) {
return Address4.isValid(host) ? new Address4(host) : new Address6(host);
}
for (const h of ['2001:db8::1', '2001:db9::1', '32.1.13.184', '32.1.13.185']) {
console.log(parse(h).isInSubnet(allowed) ? 'ALLOW' : 'BLOCK', h);
}
On affected versions:
ALLOW 2001:db8::1
BLOCK 2001:db9::1
ALLOW 32.1.13.184
BLOCK 32.1.13.185
The IPv6 rows are right. The IPv4 address whose 32 bits equal the allowlist's prefix is admitted; the one next to it is not.
Remediation
Upgrade to the patched release. In the fix, isHostInSubnet() returns false when the two addresses are of different families, and isInSubnet() inherits the answer. The methods keep accepting either family so existing call sites compile. A caller that means to compare across families converts first, with Address6.fromAddress4(), to4(), or toAddress4Nat64(): new Address6('::ffff:10.0.0.1').to4().isInSubnet(new Address4('10.0.0.0/8')) is true, as before.
If you cannot upgrade immediately, compare the classes before you compare the addresses:
const contained = host.constructor === network.constructor && host.isInSubnet(network);
A note on SSRF defense
These methods are address classifiers, not a complete SSRF defense. Regardless of this fix, a robust SSRF guard must resolve the hostname and validate the resolved IP against the socket it connects to, and account for DNS rebinding and redirects. Treat these checks as one layer, not the only one.
Affected versions
npm
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ip-address | <= 10.7.0 |
No fix yet |
| ip-address | < 10.7.1 |
10.7.1 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
ip-address npm → 10.7.1
- npm
npm install ip-address@10.7.1- yarn
yarn add ip-address@10.7.1- pnpm
pnpm add ip-address@10.7.1
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 6.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- Present
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- None
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
Weakness
CWE-697: Incorrect Comparison
The product compares two entities in a security-relevant context, but the comparison is incorrect.
CWE-843: Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
The product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type.
References
Advisories
Fixes and patches
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-rxp7-6hxx-x8q5 ip-address: Address6 matches a zone identifier in quadratic time ahead of its length limit, allowing a single long string to stall the process | Medium | Also affects ip-address |
| GHSA-rpw4-54j3-4h4q ip-address: Address6.isLinkLocal() recognizes fe80::/64 rather than fe80::/10, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass to on-link hosts | Medium | Also affects ip-address |
| GHSA-h3mg-xc3c-68pw ip-address: Address6 builds a parse diagnostic proportional to the input with no length bound, allowing a single long string to stall or crash the process | Medium | Also affects ip-address |
| GHSA-2vr4-cq9g-pvrc ip-address: no classifier recognizes the NAT64 local-use range 64:ff9b:1::/48, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass | Medium | Also affects ip-address |
| GHSA-mwp4-54f8-5fhr ip-address: Address4 decodes leading-zero octets as decimal while resolvers decode them as octal, allowing SSRF and trust-boundary bypass | High | Also affects ip-address |
| GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks | Medium | Also affects ip-address |
| GHSA-22jq-vg5j-6vgg ip-address: misclassification of IPv4-mapped/NAT64 IPv6 addresses can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks | Medium | Also affects ip-address |
| GHSA-v2v4-37r5-5v8g ip-address has XSS in Address6 HTML-emitting methods | Medium | Also affects ip-address |
Credits: waydeshi
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