GHSA-j422-qmxp-hv94 CVE-2025-66302

Grav vulnerable to Path Traversal allowing server files backup

Medium Packagist

Severity: 6.8 / 10; Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.51%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 43.85% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Fix: 1.8.0-beta.27; Upgrade getgrav/grav to this version or later

Description

Summary

A path traversal vulnerability has been identified in Grav CMS, versions 1.7.49.5 , allowing authenticated attackers
 with administrative privileges to read arbitrary files on the underlying server filesystem. This vulnerability arises due
 to insufficient input sanitization in the backup tool, where user-supplied paths are not properly restricted, enabling
 access to files outside the intended webroot directory. The impact of this vulnerability depends on the privileges of 
the user account running the application.

PoC

To accurately demonstrate the maximum potential impact of this vulnerability, the testing environment was configured in a specific way:

- Elevated Privileges: The application was run locally with the highest possible system privileges, operating under the **`root`** user account.
    
- Objective: This configuration was chosen to unequivocally show that the path traversal vulnerability is not just a theoretical issue but can lead to a complete compromise of the underlying host when combined with poor operational practices. The ability to read any file on the system is the ultimate test of the flaw's severity.
    

Proof of Concept Goal: Under these conditions, the subsequent PoC will exploit the vulnerability to read the SSH private key
 of the `root` user (`/root/.ssh/id_rsa`). The successful exfiltration of this key represents a worst-case scenario, as it would provide 
an attacker with persistent, undetectable, and complete administrative access to the host server. This highlights the critical intersection
 of an application-layer vulnerability and a infrastructure-level misconfiguration.

1- LOGIN AS ADMIN AND  GO TO  : http://127.0.0.1/admin/tools/backups
2- Change 'Root Folder' to backup directory /../../../../../../../root/.ssh/

3- CLICK  : 'SAVE'
4- CLICK  : 'Backup Now'

5- Extract Backup :

Affected versions

Packagist

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
getgrav/grav	`< 1.8.0-beta.27`	`1.8.0-beta.27`

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

getgrav/grav Packagist → `1.8.0-beta.27`

composer

composer require getgrav/grav:^1.8.0-beta.27

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: High
User interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: High
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

How to prevent it

Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would b
Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Implementation: Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes: realpath() in C getCanonicalPath() in Java GetFullPath() in ASP.NET realpath() or abs_path() in Perl realpath() in PHP
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Architecture and Design: When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Architecture and Design, Operation: Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately. This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Implementation: Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success. If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files. Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not. In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Operation, Implementation: When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66302

Packages

github.com/getgrav/grav

Timeline

Dec 1, 2025 Published
Sep 26, 2026 Last updated by the source
Nov 1, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled	High	Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-3jhr-mxmx-38cx Grav: UserInterface offsetget/offsetexists allow-listed in Twig sandbox let editor-authored content leak hashed_password and 2FA secrets via offsetGet()	Medium	Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-9ccq-2jfg-qw33 Grav: Origin validation bypass in Uri::referrer() and Pages::referrerRoute() via unanchored prefix match	Critical	Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-38p6-h87p-r4cg Grav: Non constant time nonce comparison in Utils::verifyNonce() used for CSRF protection	Medium	Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-p597-crqc-m349 Grav: The system, site, and theme Twig variables bypass the content sandbox entirely and are never covered by config_denied_paths	Medium	Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-47ch-6w46-6xm7 Grav: media_directory() Twig function allows filesystem path traversal and file content disclosure from sandboxed page content	Medium	Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55 Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion	High	Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-8hgv-xc77-jmcr Grav: Page editors can inject arbitrary script into rendered pages via the Twig sandbox's assets.addJs/addCss allowlist, escalating to super-admin	Medium	Also affects getgrav/grav

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