GHSA-j3xp-wfr4-hx87 CVE-2023-38497
Cargo not respecting umask when extracting crate archives
- Severity
- 7.9 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.70%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 53.26% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-278 Insecure Preserved Inherited Permissions
- CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
- Fix
0.72.2- Upgrade cargo to this version or later
Description
The Rust Security Response WG was notified that Cargo did not respect the umask when extracting crate archives on UNIX-like systems. If the user downloaded a crate containing files writeable by any local user, another local user could exploit this to change the source code compiled and executed by the current user.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2023-38497.
Overview
In UNIX-like systems, each file has three sets of permissions: for the user owning the file, for the group owning the file, and for all other local users. The "umask" is configured on most systems to limit those permissions during file creation, removing dangerous ones. For example, the default umask on macOS and most Linux distributions only allow the user owning a file to write to it, preventing the group owning it or other local users from doing the same.
When a dependency is downloaded by Cargo, its source code has to be extracted on disk to allow the Rust compiler to read as part of the build. To improve performance, this extraction only happens the first time a dependency is used, caching the pre-extracted files for future invocations.
Unfortunately, it was discovered that Cargo did not respect the umask during extraction, and propagated the permissions stored in the crate archive as-is. If an archive contained files writeable by any user on the system (and the system configuration didn't prevent writes through other security measures), another local user on the system could replace or tweak the source code of a dependency, potentially achieving code execution the next time the project is compiled.
Affected Versions
All Rust versions before 1.71.1 on UNIX-like systems (like macOS and Linux) are affected. Note that additional system-dependent security measures configured on the local system might prevent the vulnerability from being exploited.
Users on Windows and other non-UNIX-like systems are not affected.
Mitigations
We recommend all users to update to Rust 1.71.1, which will be released later today, as it fixes the vulnerability by respecting the umask when extracting crate archives. If you build your own toolchain, patches for 1.71.0 source tarballs are available here.
To prevent existing cached extractions from being exploitable, the Cargo binary included in Rust 1.71.1 or later will purge the caches it tries to access if they were generated by older Cargo versions.
If you cannot update to Rust 1.71.1, we recommend configuring your system to prevent other local users from accessing the Cargo directory, usually located in ~/.cargo:
chmod go= ~/.cargo
Acknowledgments
We want to thank Addison Crump for responsibly disclosing this to us according to the Rust security policy.
We also want to thank the members of the Rust project who helped us disclose the vulnerability: Weihang Lo for developing the fix; Eric Huss for reviewing the fix; Pietro Albini for writing this advisory; Pietro Albini, Manish Goregaokar and Josh Stone for coordinating this disclosure; Josh Triplett, Arlo Siemen, Scott Schafer, and Jacob Finkelman for advising during the disclosure.
Affected versions
crates.io
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| cargo | < 0.72.2 |
0.72.2 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
cargo crates.io → 0.72.2
- cargo
cargo update -p cargo --precise 0.72.2
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 7.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-278: Insecure Preserved Inherited Permissions
A product inherits a set of insecure permissions for an object, e.g. when copying from an archive file, without user awareness or involvement.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.
How to prevent it
- Implementation: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
- Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
- Implementation, Installation: During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
- System Configuration: For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
- Documentation: Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
- Installation: Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
- Operation, System Configuration: Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
- Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
- github.com/rust-lang/cargo/security/advisories/GHSA-j3xp-wfr4-hx87
- github.com/rust-lang/cargo/pull/12443
- github.com/rust-lang/cargo/commit/d78bbf4bde3c6b95caca7512f537c6f9721426ff
- en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umask
- github.com/rust-lang/wg-security-response/tree/main/patches/CVE-2023-38497
- lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QGKE6…
- lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QMEXG…
- rust-lang.org/policies/security
- lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QMEXG…
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-jq42-7mfv-hm57 Cargo crates in third party registries can override the cached source of other crates | Medium | Also affects cargo |
| GHSA-p688-r7jv-fm6f Cargo can be coerced to share credentials between registries | Medium | Also affects cargo |
| GHSA-wrrj-h57r-vx9p Malicious dependencies can inject arbitrary JavaScript into cargo-generated timing reports | Medium | Also affects cargo |
| GHSA-r5w3-xm58-jv6j Cargo did not verify SSH host keys | Medium | Also affects cargo |
| GHSA-2hvr-h6gw-qrxp Cargo extracting malicious crates can fill the file system | Medium | Also affects cargo |
| GHSA-rfj2-q3h3-hm5j Cargo extracting malicious crates can corrupt arbitrary files | High | Also affects cargo |
| GHSA-9f3p-wvj7-q82x Cargo prior to Rust 1.26.0 may download the wrong dependency | High | Also affects cargo |
| GHSA-jf86-9434-f8c2 Keycloak Authentication Error | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-278 |
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