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GHSA-j3rg-3rgm-537h CVE-2023-26492

Directus vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery On File Import

High npm
Severity
5.0 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.96%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 61.54% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Fix
9.23.0
Upgrade directus to this version or later

Description

Summary

Directus versions <=9.22.4 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when importing a file from a remote web server (POST to /files/import). An attacker can bypass the security controls that were implemented to patch vulnerability CVE-2022-23080 by performing a DNS rebinding attack and view sensitive data from internal servers or perform a local port scan (eg. can access internal metadata API for AWS at http://169.254.169.254 event if 169.254.169.254 is in the deny IP list).

Details

DNS rebinding attacks work by running a DNS name server that resolves two different IP addresses when a domain is resolved simultaneously. This type of attack can be exploited to bypass the IP address deny list validation that was added to /api/src/services/file.ts for the function importOne to mitigate the previous SSRF vulnerability CVE-2022-23080. The validation in /api/src/services/file.ts first checks if the resolved IP address for a domain name does not a resolve to an IP address in the deny list:

let ip = resolvedUrl.hostname;

if (net.isIP(ip) === 0) {
    try {
        ip = (await lookupDNS(ip)).address;
    } catch (err: any) {
        logger.warn(err, `Couldn't lookup the DNS for url ${importURL}`);
        throw new ServiceUnavailableException(`Couldn't fetch file from url "${importURL}"`, {
            service: 'external-file',
        });
    }
}

if (env.IMPORT_IP_DENY_LIST.includes('0.0.0.0')) {
    const networkInterfaces = os.networkInterfaces();

    for (const networkInfo of Object.values(networkInterfaces)) {
        if (!networkInfo) continue;

        for (const info of networkInfo) {
            if (info.address === ip) {
                logger.warn(`Requested URL ${importURL} resolves to localhost.`);
                throw new ServiceUnavailableException(`Couldn't fetch file from url "${importURL}"`, {
                    service: 'external-file',
                });
            }
        }
    }
}

if (env.IMPORT_IP_DENY_LIST.includes(ip)) {
    logger.warn(`Requested URL ${importURL} resolves to a denied IP address.`);
    throw new ServiceUnavailableException(`Couldn't fetch file from url "${importURL}"`, {
        service: 'external-file',
    });
}

Once it validates that the resolved IP address is not in the deny list, then it uses axios to GET the url and saves the response content.

try {
    fileResponse = await axios.get<Readable>(encodeURL(importURL), {
        responseType: 'stream',
    });
} catch (err: any) {
    logger.warn(err, `Couldn't fetch file from url "${importURL}"`);
    throw new ServiceUnavailableException(`Couldn't fetch file from url "${importURL}"`, {
        service: 'external-file',
    });
}

However, this validation check and fetching the web resource causes to DNS queries that enable a DNS rebinding attack. On the first DNS query, an attacker controlled name server can be configured to resolve to an external IP address that is not in the deny list to bypass the validation. Then when axios is called, the name server resolves the domain name to a local IP address.

PoC

To demonstrate we will be using an online tool named rebinder. Rebinder randomly changes the IP address it resolves to depending on the subdomain. For an example, 7f000001.8efa468e.rbndr.us can resolve to either 142.250.70.142 (google.com) or 127.0.0.1. Sending multiple POST requests to /files/import using this domain will eventually cause a resolution to 142.250.70.142 first to bypass the validation then fetch the sensitive from an internal server when axios is called.

The following screenshots show what it looks like when a successful attack occurs.

Downloading a file named secret.txt from a webserver running from http://127.0.0.1/secret.txt image

Receiving the request from the internal server. Note that the incoming connection is from 127.0.0.1. image

After downloading the file it leaks the content of the secret file. image

Impact

An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to access highly sensitive internal server and steal sensitive information. An example is on Cloud Environments that utilise internal APIs for managing machine and privileges. For an example, if directus is hosted on AWS EC2 instance and has an IAM role assigned to the EC2 instance then an attacker can exploit this vulnerability to steal the AWS access keys to impersonate the EC2 instance using the AWS API.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
directus
< 9.23.0
9.23.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

directus npm → 9.23.0

npm
npm install directus@9.23.0
yarn
yarn add directus@9.23.0
pnpm
pnpm add directus@9.23.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-c6w9-5g5j-jh2p
Directus: Authorization-dependent response served from unsegmented cache key
High Also affects directus
GHSA-j5h6-vqc3-phqh
Directus: SSRF Protection Bypass via 0.0.0.0 in File Import
High Also affects directus
GHSA-38hg-ww64-rrwc
Directus: Authenticated Users Can Extract Concealed Fields via Aggregate Queries
High Also affects directus
GHSA-6q22-g298-grjh
Directus: Unauthenticated Denial of Service via GraphQL Alias Amplification of Expensive Health Check Resolver
High Also affects directus
GHSA-ph52-67fq-75wj
Directus: GraphQL Alias Amplification Denial of Service Due to Missing Query Cost/Complexity Limits
Medium Also affects directus
GHSA-mvv8-v4jj-g47j
Directus: Sensitive fields exposed in revision history
Medium Also affects directus
GHSA-qqmv-5p3g-px89
Directus: TUS Upload Authorization Bypass Allows Arbitrary File Overwrite
High Also affects directus
GHSA-wv3h-5fx7-966h
Directus: SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in File Import
High Also affects directus
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