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GHSA-hxxf-235m-72v3 CVE-2024-11394 PYSEC-2024-229

Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Hugging Face Transformers

High PyPI
Severity
8.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
2.73%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 86.09% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
4.48.0
Upgrade transformers to this version or later

Description

Hugging Face Transformers Trax Model Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Hugging Face Transformers. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.

The specific flaw exists within the handling of model files. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in deserialization of untrusted data. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the current user. Was ZDI-CAN-25012.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
transformers
< 4.48.0
4.48.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

transformers PyPI → 4.48.0

pip
pip install --upgrade "transformers>=4.48.0"
poetry
poetry add "transformers>=4.48.0"
uv
uv add "transformers>=4.48.0"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 8.8

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-x9r9-c232-4q39
Hugging Face Transformers downloads custom generation code before trust consent
High Also affects transformers
GHSA-xrqw-3rrv-vx5w
Transformers save_pretrained path traversal allows arbitrary file writes through chat template names
High Also affects transformers
GHSA-fgcw-684q-jj6r
huggingface/transformers: Arbitrary Code Execution During Model Initialization in the LightGlue Model Loading Path
Critical Also affects transformers
GHSA-29pf-2h5f-8g72
HuggingFace transformers vulnerable to remote code execution
High Also affects transformers
GHSA-69w3-r845-3855
HuggingFace Transformers allows for arbitrary code execution in the `Trainer` class
High Also affects transformers
PYSEC-2025-218
Hugging Face Transformers GLM4 Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.
High Also affects transformers
PYSEC-2025-217
Hugging Face Transformers X-CLIP Checkpoint Conversion Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.
High Also affects transformers
PYSEC-2025-216
Hugging Face Transformers HuBERT convert_config Code Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.
High Also affects transformers
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