GHSA-hmgr-67hw-j2cq CVE-2026-44561 PYSEC-2026-2732
Open WebUI: Deactivated Channel Members Retain Full Access to Group/DM Channels
- Severity
- 5.4 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.18%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 7.42% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Fix
0.9.0- Upgrade open-webui to this version or later
Description
Deactivated Channel Members Retain Full Access to Group/DM Channels
Affected Component
Channel membership authorization check:
backend/open_webui/models/channels.py(lines 663-673,is_user_channel_member)- Used at 15 locations in
backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions with the group/DM channel feature.
Description
The is_user_channel_member function checks whether a ChannelMember row exists but does not check the is_active field. When a user is deactivated from a group or DM channel (removed by the channel owner, or leaves voluntarily), their membership row persists with is_active=False and status='left'. Because the authorization check ignores this field, the deactivated user retains full read and write access to the channel via direct API calls.
The channel correctly disappears from the deactivated user's channel list (the listing query at get_channels_by_user_id properly filters on is_active), but all 15 message-level endpoints in the router rely on is_user_channel_member for authorization, which does not filter on is_active.
# models/channels.py:663 — missing is_active check
def is_user_channel_member(self, channel_id, user_id, db=None):
membership = db.query(ChannelMember).filter(
ChannelMember.channel_id == channel_id,
ChannelMember.user_id == user_id,
).first()
return membership is not None # True even when is_active=False
Compare with get_channel_by_id_and_user_id (line 778) which correctly checks ChannelMember.is_active.is_(True).
CVSS 3.1 Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via API calls |
| Attack Complexity | Low (L) | No special conditions beyond knowing the channel ID (which the user had as a former member) |
| Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires a valid user account and prior channel membership |
| User Interaction | None (N) | No victim interaction required |
| Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact is within the same authorization boundary (the channel) |
| Confidentiality | Low (L) | Can read messages in a channel the user should no longer access |
| Integrity | Low (L) | Can post, edit, and delete messages in the channel |
| Availability | None (N) | No denial of service |
Attack Scenario
- User A and User B are members of a private group channel.
- The channel owner removes User B (or User B leaves). User B's membership is set to
is_active=False, status='left'. - The channel disappears from User B's UI — but User B noted the channel ID while they were a member.
- User B calls the API directly:
GET /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages— reads all messages, including those posted after deactivationPOST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/post— posts new messagesPOST /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{id}/update— edits messagesDELETE /api/v1/channels/{channel_id}/messages/{id}/delete— deletes messages
- All requests succeed because
is_user_channel_memberreturnsTrue.
Impact
- Deactivated users can continue reading all new messages posted after their removal (confidentiality breach)
- Deactivated users can post, edit, and delete messages (integrity breach)
- The deactivation mechanism provides a false sense of security — channel owners believe removed users have lost access
Preconditions
- Channels feature must be enabled (disabled by default)
- Attacker must have a valid user account
- Attacker must have been a member of the channel at some point (and thus knows the channel ID)
Recommended Fix
Add is_active filtering to is_user_channel_member:
def is_user_channel_member(self, channel_id, user_id, db=None):
membership = db.query(ChannelMember).filter(
ChannelMember.channel_id == channel_id,
ChannelMember.user_id == user_id,
ChannelMember.is_active.is_(True),
).first()
return membership is not None
This aligns it with the existing get_channel_by_id_and_user_id method which already applies this filter correctly.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| open-webui | < 0.9.0 |
0.9.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
open-webui PyPI → 0.9.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.9.0"- poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.9.0"- uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.9.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.4
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-284: Improper Access Control
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design, Operation: Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
- Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
- Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
- Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
- System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-wvm9-9g5j-623f Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-4qg5-cxx4-g927 Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-jqhh-cjmq-vmv6 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-5x7x-4c3c-qf5w Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-34r3-9m95-vq73 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach the Azure platform channel via server-side web fetch | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-2724-6cpj-gf3v Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3pf7-q2g3-wj28 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
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