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GHSA-h9g4-589h-68xv CVE-2026-28468

OpenClaw has an authentication bypass in sandbox browser bridge server

High npm
Severity
8.5 / 10
High · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.16%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 5.33% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Fix
2026.2.14
Upgrade openclaw to this version or later

Description

Summary

openclaw could start the sandbox browser bridge server without authentication.

When the sandboxed browser is enabled, openclaw runs a local (loopback) HTTP bridge that exposes browser control endpoints (for example /profiles, /tabs, /tabs/open, /agent/*). Due to missing auth wiring in the sandbox initialization path, that bridge server accepted requests without requiring gateway auth.

Impact

A local attacker (any process on the same machine) could access the bridge server port and:

  • enumerate open tabs and retrieve CDP WebSocket URLs
  • open/close/navigate tabs
  • execute JavaScript in page contexts via CDP
  • exfiltrate cookies/session data and page contents from authenticated sessions

This is a localhost-only exposure (CVSS AV:L), but provides full browser-session compromise for sandboxed browser usage.

Affected Versions

  • Introduced in: 2026.1.29-beta.1 (first npm release that shipped the sandbox browser bridge)
  • Affected range: >=2026.1.29-beta.1 <2026.2.14

Patched Versions

  • 2026.2.14

Mitigation

  • Upgrade to 2026.2.14 (recommended).
  • Or disable the sandboxed browser (agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.enabled=false).

Fix Details

  • The sandbox browser bridge server now always requires auth and enforces the same gateway browser control auth (token/password) that loopback browser clients already use.
  • Additional hardening: bridge server refuses non-loopback binds; local helper servers are bound to loopback.
  • Added regression tests (including unit coverage for per-port bridge auth fallback).

Fix commits:

  • openclaw/openclaw@4711a943e30bc58016247152ba06472dab09d0b0
  • openclaw/openclaw@6dd6bce997c48752134f2d6ed89b27de01ced7e3
  • openclaw/openclaw@cd84885a4ac78eadb7bf321aae98db9519426d67

Credits

Thanks to Adnan Jakati (@jackhax) of Praetorian for reporting this issue.

Affected versions

npm

PackageVulnerableFixed in
openclaw
>= 2026.1.29-beta.1, < 2026.2.14
2026.2.14

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

openclaw npm → 2026.2.14

npm
npm install openclaw@2026.2.14
yarn
yarn add openclaw@2026.2.14
pnpm
pnpm add openclaw@2026.2.14

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 8.5

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
High
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None
Exploit maturity
Not defined
Scope
X

CVSS 3.1 7.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability. Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port. In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
  • Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
  • Architecture and Design: Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks. In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
  • Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
  • Implementation, System Configuration, Operation: When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

References

Advisories

Packages

Other links

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
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GHSA-c226-q6fx-6j6c
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