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GHSA-h7xg-cmpp-48hf CVE-2024-10553 PYSEC-2026-351

H2O Deserialization of Untrusted Data Vulnerability

Critical MavenPyPI
Severity
9.8 / 10
Critical · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.59%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 75.60% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

A vulnerability in the h2oai/h2o-3 REST API versions 3.46.0.4 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via deserialization of untrusted data. The vulnerability exists in the endpoints POST /99/ImportSQLTable and POST /3/SaveToHiveTable, where user-controlled JDBC URLs are passed to DriverManager.getConnection, leading to deserialization if a MySQL or PostgreSQL driver is available in the classpath. This issue is fixed in version 3.46.0.6.

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
ai.h2o:h2o-core
< 3.46.0.6
3.46.0.6

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
h2o
< 3.46.0.6
3.46.0.6

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

ai.h2o:h2o-core Maven → 3.46.0.6

maven
<dependency><groupId>ai.h2o</groupId><artifactId>h2o-core</artifactId><version>3.46.0.6</version></dependency>
gradle
implementation("ai.h2o:h2o-core:3.46.0.6")

h2o PyPI → 3.46.0.6

pip
pip install --upgrade "h2o>=3.46.0.6"
poetry
poetry add "h2o>=3.46.0.6"
uv
uv add "h2o>=3.46.0.6"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 9.8

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-qmcv-hh7c-3m56
H2O-3 is Vulnerable to Code Injection
Critical Also affects ai.h2o:h2o-core
GHSA-wj3h-wx8g-x699
H2O has an External Control of File Name or Path vulnerability
Critical Also affects ai.h2o:h2o-core
GHSA-5w3j-gwgh-4rfv
H2O affected by a deserialization vulnerability
Critical Also affects ai.h2o:h2o-core
GHSA-g48v-3p35-88jr
H2O Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Overwrite
High Also affects ai.h2o:h2o-core
GHSA-5c8j-g96x-cj78
H2O Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via `HEAD` Request
High Also affects ai.h2o:h2o-core
GHSA-p2vc-m5fv-9w9m
H2O Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via `/3/ImportFiles` Endpoint
High Also affects ai.h2o:h2o-core
GHSA-6w62-3jvj-mfj6
H2O Vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via Large GZIP Parsing
High Also affects ai.h2o:h2o-core
GHSA-m37h-8r48-2cxj
H2O Vulnerable to Execution of Arbitrary Files
Medium Also affects ai.h2o:h2o-core
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