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GHSA-h3j8-fr5q-8rfr CVE-2021-31649

JFinal Java Deserialization Vulnerability

Critical Maven
Severity
Critical
The publisher's own rating, not a CVSS score
Exploit chance (EPSS)
1.82%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 78.75% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
None yet
No fixed version published

Description

In applications using jfinal 4.9.08 and below, there is a deserialization vulnerability when using redis which can lead to remote code execution

Affected versions

Maven

PackageVulnerableFixed in
com.jfinal:jfinal
<= 4.9.08
No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-qh2w-9m7w-hjg2
Cross-site Scripting in JFinal
Medium Also affects com.jfinal:jfinal
GHSA-v435-pfj6-68r3
Cross-site Scripting in JFinal
Medium Also affects com.jfinal:jfinal
GHSA-3j4x-9q9q-3277
Cross-site Scripting in JFinal
Medium Also affects com.jfinal:jfinal
GHSA-859h-4w58-78xw
Cross-site Scripting in JFinal
Medium Also affects com.jfinal:jfinal
GHSA-xv7p-jw46-8r85
Cross-site Scripting in JFinalcms
Medium Also affects com.jfinal:jfinal
GHSA-p3ph-6245-4wfc
Cross-site Scripting in JFinalcms
Medium Also affects com.jfinal:jfinal
GHSA-m3p6-43xj-pf9v
Cross-site Scripting in JFinalcms
Medium Also affects com.jfinal:jfinal
GHSA-3hf6-f8ch-5869
Cross-site Scripting in JFinalcms
Medium Also affects com.jfinal:jfinal
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