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GHSA-gm3x-23wp-hc2c CVE-2025-66490 GO-2025-4206

Path Normalization Bypass in Traefik Router + Middleware Rules

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.44%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 38.20% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-436 Interpretation Conflict
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Impact

There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the requests using a PathPrefix, Path or PathRegex matcher.

When Traefik is configured to route the requests to a backend using a matcher based on the path; if the request path contains an encoded restricted character from the following set ('/', '', 'Null', ';', '?', '#'), it’s possible to target a backend, exposed using another router, by-passing the middlewares chain.

Example

apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRoute
metadata:
  name: my-service
spec:
  routes:
    - match: PathPrefix(‘/admin/’)
      kind: Rule
      services:
        - name: service-a
          port: 8080
      middlewares:
        - name: my-security-middleware
    - match: PathPrefix(‘/’)
      kind: Rule
      services:
        - name: service-a
          port: 8080

In such a case, the request http://mydomain.example.com/admin%2F will reach the backend service-a without operating the middleware my-security-middleware and passing the security put in place for the /admin/ path.

Patches

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>### Summary A vulnerability exists in Traefik’s path matching logic that allows attackers to bypass access-control middleware (e.g., blocking rules) by using URL-encoded paths. I found this vulnerability while playing PwnSec CTF 2025 with my team @0xL4ugh

Details

Traefik evaluates router rules before decoding or normalizing the request path, but forwards the request after decoding to the backend service. As a result, routes meant to block access to sensitive endpoints (such as internal, beta, or admin endpoints) can be trivially bypassed.

PoC

Traefik configuration used in this issue :

  entryPoints = ["web"]
  rule = "PathPrefix(`/report_note`)"
  priority = 10
  middlewares = ["block-access"]
  service = "flask-service"

[http.middlewares.block-access.replacePathRegex]
  regex = ".*"
  replacement = "/blocked"

The intention is to block all access to /report_note.

However, the following request bypasses the block:

POST /%2freport_note HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:62814


Impact

Access Control Bypass: Any endpoint intended to be blocked (e.g., admin/debug/beta APIs) can be accessed by URL-encoding slashes or other characters.

This could lead to:

  • Unauthorized access to restricted endpoints
  • Execution of protected internal functionality
  • Potential privilege escalation
  • Bypass of security policies enforced via Traefik routing rules

</details>

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/traefik/traefik
<= 1.7.34
No fix yet
github.com/traefik/traefik
all versions
No fix yet
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2
< 2.11.32
2.11.32
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
< 3.6.3
3.6.3

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 Go → 2.11.32

go
go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v2@v2.11.32 && go mod tidy

github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 Go → 3.6.3

go
go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v3@v3.6.3 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
None
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
Low
Integrity (subsequent systems)
Low
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-436: Interpretation Conflict

Product A handles inputs or steps differently than Product B, which causes A to perform incorrect actions based on its perception of B's state.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GO-2026-6558
Traefik: BasicAuth singleflight coalescing reintroduces an unauthenticated username-enumeration timing oracle
Medium Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik
GHSA-f52w-8j3h-j724
Traefik: Rootless HTTP/1 request-target routes as "/" but is forwarded verbatim, bypassing path-scoped routing, middleware guards and access logging
High Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik
GHSA-w4v4-9rw7-5326
Traefik: Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') and Incorrect Authorization
Critical Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik
GHSA-qqjf-53cj-pwvv
Traefik HTTP/3 Backend NTLM Connection Reuse
Critical Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik
GO-2026-6467
Traefik entrypoint header-name sanitization bypassed via request trailers
High Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik
GHSA-rf44-j88r-hh8c
Traefik: ForwardAuth identity spoofing via dot-form header alias
High Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik
GHSA-7ghq-v6jf-g56c
Traefik: respondingTimeouts.readTimeout is not applied to HTTP/3, leaving slow-body uploads unbounded
Medium Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik
GHSA-62fc-8686-hfmq
Traefik: `allowCrossNamespace=false` bypass via `@kubernetescrd` TraefikService backendRef
Medium Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik
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