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GHSA-gjc5-8cfh-653x CVE-2025-66299

Grav is Vulnerable to Security Sandbox Bypass with SSTI (Server Side Template Injection)

High Packagist
Severity
8.8 / 10
High · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.61%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 49.12% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-1336 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine
CWE-94 Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Fix
1.8.0-beta.27
Upgrade getgrav/grav to this version or later

Description

Summary

Grav CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) that allows any authenticated user with editor permissions to execute arbitrary code on the remote server, bypassing the existing security sandbox.

Details

Grav CMS uses a custom sandbox to protect the powerful Twig methods such as registerUndefinedFilterCallback(). These methods are designed to prevent SSTI attacks by denying the execution of dangerous PHP functions (e.g., exec(), passthru(), system(), etc.) within Twig template directives.

The current defense mechanism relies on a blacklist of prohibited functions (PHP, Twig), checked through the isDangerousFunction() method in the file system/src/Grav/Common/Twig.php:

$this->twig->registerUndefinedFilterCallback(function (string $name) use ($config) {
    $allowed = $config->get('system.twig.safe_filters');
    if (is_array($allowed) && in_array($name, $allowed, true) && function_exists($name)) {
        return new TwigFilter($name, $name);
    }
    if ($config->get('system.twig.undefined_filters')) {
        if (function_exists($name)) {
            if (!Utils::isDangerousFunction($name)) {
                user_error("PHP function {$name}() used as Twig filter. This is deprecated in Grav 1.7. Please add it to system configuration: `system.twig.safe_filters`", E_USER_DEPRECATED);

                return new TwigFilter($name, $name);
            }

            /** @var Debugger $debugger */
            $debugger = $this->grav['debugger'];
            $debugger->addException(new RuntimeException("Blocked potentially dangerous PHP function {$name}() being used as Twig filter. If you really want to use it, please add it to system configuration: `system.twig.safe_filters`"));
        }

        return new TwigFilter($name, static function () {});
    }

    return false;
});

In this code, the isDangerousFunction() check is bypassed if the filter defined in the $name variable is considered safe. Only an administrator can mark a function as safe by adding it to the system.twig.safe_filters configuration properties (whitelists that are empty by default) in the system/config/system.yaml file.

Notably, the Twig class is defined within the system/src/Grav/Common/Twig.php file, and the Twig object (and environment) is instantiated there:

/**
 * Class Twig
 * @package Grav\Common\Twig
 */
class Twig
{
    /** @var Environment */
    public $twig;
    /** @var array */
    public $twig_vars = [];
    /** @var array */
    public $twig_paths;
    /** @var string */
    public $template;

    // Constructor
    public function __construct(Grav $grav)
    {
        $this->grav = $grav;
        $this->twig_paths = [];
    }

    // Twig initialization method
    public function init()
    {
        if (null === $this->twig) {
            /** @var Config $config */
            $config = $this->grav['config'];
            /** @var UniformResourceLocator $locator */
            $locator = $this->grav['locator'];
            /** @var Language $language */
            $language = $this->grav['language'];

            $active_language = $language->getActive();
        ...
        }
    }
}

Since the security sandbox does not fully protect the Twig object, it is possible to interact with it (e.g., call methods, read/write attributes) through maliciously crafted Twig template directives injected into a web page. This allows an authenticated editor to add arbitrary functions to the Twig attribute system.twig.safe_filters, effectively bypassing the Grav CMS sandbox.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

An authenticated user with permission to edit a page (with Twig processing enabled) in the Grav CMS admin console can inject malicious template directives to execute arbitrary OS commands on the remote web server.

For example, to exploit the vulnerability and execute the prohibited system('id') command, bypassing the sandbox, an editor could create/edit a web page with the following template directives:

{% set arr = {'1':'system', '2':'exec'} %}
{{ var_dump(grav.twig.twig_vars['config'].set('system.twig.safe_filters', arr)) }}
{{ 'id'|system }}
{{ 'whoami'|exec }}

Once the page is saved, it can be accessed by unauthenticated users, triggering the execution of the system('id') command on the server hosting the vulnerable Grav CMS.

Impact

The vulnerability allows remote code execution on the underlying server, which could lead to full server compromise.

Affected versions

Packagist

PackageVulnerableFixed in
getgrav/grav
< 1.8.0-beta.27
1.8.0-beta.27

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

getgrav/grav Packagist → 1.8.0-beta.27

composer
composer require getgrav/grav:^1.8.0-beta.27

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 8.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-1336: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine

The product uses a template engine to insert or process externally-influenced input, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements or syntax that can be interpreted as template expressions or other code directives when processed by the engine.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Choose a template engine that offers a sandbox or restricted mode, or at least limits the power of any available expressions, function calls, or commands.
  • Implementation: Use the template engine's sandbox or restricted mode, if available.

CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
  • Architecture and Design: Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product. Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
  • Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().
  • Testing: Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Operation: Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
  • Implementation: For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-xjw5-q542-3vmr
Grav: config_denied_paths default list omits `system`, exposing real secrets (e.g. system.cache.redis.password) via the Twig sandbox when config_access is enabled
High Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-3jhr-mxmx-38cx
Grav: UserInterface offsetget/offsetexists allow-listed in Twig sandbox let editor-authored content leak hashed_password and 2FA secrets via offsetGet()
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-9ccq-2jfg-qw33
Grav: Origin validation bypass in Uri::referrer() and Pages::referrerRoute() via unanchored prefix match
Critical Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-38p6-h87p-r4cg
Grav: Non constant time nonce comparison in Utils::verifyNonce() used for CSRF protection
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-p597-crqc-m349
Grav: The system, site, and theme Twig variables bypass the content sandbox entirely and are never covered by config_denied_paths
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-47ch-6w46-6xm7
Grav: media_directory() Twig function allows filesystem path traversal and file content disclosure from sandboxed page content
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-jq29-c7v8-rg55
Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
High Also affects getgrav/grav
GHSA-8hgv-xc77-jmcr
Grav: Page editors can inject arbitrary script into rendered pages via the Twig sandbox's assets.addJs/addCss allowlist, escalating to super-admin
Medium Also affects getgrav/grav
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