GHSA-fw38-pc54-jvx9 CVE-2026-49343 GO-2026-5379
Klever-Go KVM: Throttler slot leak in trie account-data sync causes epoch bootstrap / state sync DoS
- Severity
- 5.9 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.41%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 35.50% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
- CWE-772 Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
- Fix
1.7.18- Upgrade github.com/klever-io/klever-go to this version or later
Description
Summary
The account-data trie syncers leak bounded throttler slots on error paths in syncDataTrie(). Each failed trie sync permanently consumes one slot from
the NumGoRoutinesThrottler, and the slot is never returned unless the sync succeeds or the root hash was already present.
I confirmed this on the current default branch develop at commit 9640d63 (observed on May 20, 2026). I also confirmed the bug with a runtime PoC
using the real timeout path in trieSyncer.StartSyncing(): two timed-out sync attempts are enough to exhaust a throttler with capacity 2.
This affects the epoch bootstrap path because syncUserAccountsState() and syncKappAccountsState() create bounded throttlers and abort bootstrap
immediately if the syncer returns an error. Once enough trie-root sync attempts fail, the syncer cannot make forward progress and bootstrap fails.
Affected Components
data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.godata/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.godata/trie/sync.gocore/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.gocore/bootstrap/process.go
Affected Version
Verified on:
developHEAD9640d63
Please check whether the same code is present in supported 1.7.x releases.
Suggested Severity
High
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
Both account-data syncers call StartProcessing() before creating / starting the trie syncer, but they only call EndProcessing() on the success path
and on the duplicate-root early return.
userAccountsSyncer.syncDataTrie():
func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error {
u.throttler.StartProcessing()
u.syncerMutex.Lock()
if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok {
u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
u.throttler.EndProcessing()
return nil
}
dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...)
if err != nil {
u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
return err
}
trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg)
if err != nil {
u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
return err
}
u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
err = trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx)
if err != nil {
return err
}
u.throttler.EndProcessing()
return nil
}
The same bug exists in kappAccountsSyncer.syncDataTrie().
Missing slot release paths
After StartProcessing(), the following error paths return without EndProcessing():
- trie.NewTrie(...) returns an error
- trie.NewTrieSyncer(...) returns an error
- trieSyncer.StartSyncing(...) returns an error
Why this matters
NumGoRoutinesThrottler is a strict bounded counter:
func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) CanProcess() bool {
valCounter := atomic.LoadInt32(&ngrt.counter)
return valCounter < ngrt.max
}
func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) StartProcessing() {
atomic.AddInt32(&ngrt.counter, 1)
}
func (ngrt *NumGoRoutinesThrottler) EndProcessing() {
atomic.AddInt32(&ngrt.counter, -1)
}
Once leaked, a slot remains consumed for the lifetime of that throttler instance.
The parent loops in both syncers wait for capacity before starting the next account-data trie sync:
for !u.throttler.CanProcess() {
select {
case <-time.After(timeBetweenRetries):
continue
case <-ctx.Done():
return common.ErrTimeIsOut
}
}
So after enough failures, further roots stop progressing and the sync operation eventually returns time is out.
Bootstrap impact
Epoch bootstrap uses these syncers directly and aborts on any error:
err = e.syncUserAccountsState(e.epochStartMeta.Header.TrieRoot)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
err = e.syncKappAccountsState(e.epochStartMeta.Header.KAppsTrieRoot)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
The throttlers for these paths are real bounded throttlers created from numConcurrentTrieSyncers.
Proof of Concept
I verified the bug with the real timeout path, not only with a canceled context.
The PoC below uses:
- a real NumGoRoutinesThrottler with capacity 2
- a real trieSyncer.StartSyncing()
- an empty trie-node cache and a request handler that never supplies nodes
- a short sync timeout (1s) so StartSyncing() returns trie.ErrTimeIsOut
After the first failed sync, one slot remains leaked. After the second failed sync, the throttler is exhausted.
PoC test
package syncer
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
commonmock "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock"
corethrottler "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/throttler"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data"
"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/trie"
triestats "github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/trie/statistics"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t *testing.T) *baseAccountsSyncer {
t.Helper()
storageManager, err := trie.NewTrieStorageManagerWithoutPruning(commonmock.NewMemDbMock())
require.NoError(t, err)
return &baseAccountsSyncer{
hasher: commonmock.HasherMock{},
marshalizer: &commonmock.MarshalizerMock{},
trieSyncers: make(map[string]data.TrieSyncer),
dataTries: make(map[string]data.Trie),
trieStorageManager: storageManager,
requestHandler: &commonmock.RequestHandlerStub{},
timeout: time.Second,
cacher: commonmock.NewCacherStub(),
maxTrieLevelInMemory: 5,
name: "timeout-poc",
maxHardCapForMissingNodes: 1,
}
}
func TestPOC_UserAccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout(t *testing.T) {
thr, err := corethrottler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2)
require.NoError(t, err)
s := &userAccountsSyncer{
baseAccountsSyncer: newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t),
throttler: thr,
}
err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-1"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background())
require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut)
require.True(t, thr.CanProcess())
err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-2"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background())
require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut)
require.False(t, thr.CanProcess())
}
func TestPOC_KappAccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout(t *testing.T) {
thr, err := corethrottler.NewNumGoRoutinesThrottler(2)
require.NoError(t, err)
s := &kappAccountsSyncer{
baseAccountsSyncer: newBaseSyncerForTimeoutPOC(t),
throttler: thr,
}
err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-1"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background())
require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut)
require.True(t, thr.CanProcess())
err = s.syncDataTrie([]byte("missing-root-2"), triestats.NewTrieSyncStatistics(), context.Background())
require.ErrorIs(t, err, trie.ErrTimeIsOut)
require.False(t, thr.CanProcess())
}
Command used
go test ./data/syncer -run 'TestPOC_(User|Kapp)AccountsSyncer_LeaksThrottlerSlotOnTrieTimeout' -count=1
Result
ok github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/syncer 4.005s
This confirms the leak with the real timeout path from trieSyncer.StartSyncing().
Impact
An attacker who can repeatedly cause trie-node sync failures or timeouts during bootstrap can consume the bounded sync throttler until no capacity remains.
Once enough slots are leaked:
- additional account-data trie sync attempts stop making progress
- the parent loop waits until context timeout
- SyncAccounts() fails
- epoch bootstrap fails
This is a core node availability issue. It affects fresh/restarting nodes and validators that need to bootstrap or resync state.
This is not a theoretical issue:
- StartSyncing() performs network-dependent trie-node retrieval
- it already has explicit timeout / failure paths
- the leaked throttler slots are confirmed by runtime PoC
Recommended Fix
Release the slot with defer immediately after StartProcessing() and cancel the defer only if ownership is intentionally transferred, which is not the case here.
Example fix pattern:
func (u *userAccountsSyncer) syncDataTrie(rootHash []byte, ssh data.SyncStatisticsHandler, ctx context.Context) error {
u.throttler.StartProcessing()
defer u.throttler.EndProcessing()
u.syncerMutex.Lock()
defer u.syncerMutex.Unlock()
if _, ok := u.dataTries[string(rootHash)]; ok {
return nil
}
dataTrie, err := trie.NewTrie(...)
if err != nil {
return err
}
trieSyncer, err := trie.NewTrieSyncer(arg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
u.trieSyncers[string(rootHash)] = trieSyncer
return trieSyncer.StartSyncing(rootHash, ctx)
}
The same pattern should be applied to:
- data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go
- data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go
References
- data/syncer/userAccountsSyncer.go
- data/syncer/kappAccountsSyncer.go
- data/trie/sync.go
- core/throttler/numGoRoutinesThrottler.go
- core/bootstrap/process.go
- SECURITY.md
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/klever-io/klever-go | < 1.7.18 |
1.7.18 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/klever-io/klever-go Go → 1.7.18
- go
go get github.com/klever-io/klever-go@v1.7.18 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Implementation: Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
The product does not release a resource after its effective lifetime has ended, i.e., after the resource is no longer needed.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, languages such as Java, Ruby, and Lisp perform automatic garbage collection that releases memory for objects that have been deallocated.
- Implementation: It is good practice to be responsible for freeing all resources you allocate and to be consistent with how and where you free resources in a function. If you allocate resources that you intend to free upon completion of the function, you must be sure to free the resources at all exit points for that function including error conditions.
- Operation, Architecture and Design: Use resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
References
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
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| GHSA-9v8p-frvj-2pcm Klever-Go: /log controls global node logging | High | Also affects github.com/klever-io/klever-go |
| GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply | High | Also affects github.com/klever-io/klever-go |
| GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv klever-go: Percentage-transfer royalty skips the source debit at exactly-100% splits | High | Also affects github.com/klever-io/klever-go |
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