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GHSA-fr2g-9hjm-wr23 CVE-2023-47090 GO-2023-2133

NATS.io: Adding accounts for just the system account adds auth bypass

Medium Go
Severity
6.5 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.83%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 57.41% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-305 Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness
Fix
2.9.23
Upgrade github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 to this version or later

Description

Background

NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.

NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable.

Problem Description

Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication.

Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block.

If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the no_auth_user account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules.

This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access.

But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled.

The blind-spot on our part came from encouraging and documenting a switch to using only "accounts", instead of "authorization".

In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the no_auth_user target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior.

Affected versions

NATS Server:

  • 2.2.0 up to and including 2.9.22 and 2.10.1
  • Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.10.2 and backported to 2.9.23

Workarounds

In the "accounts" block, define a second non-system account, leave it empty.

accounts {
    SYS: {
        users: [
            { user: sysuser, password: makemeasandwich }
        ]
    }
    DUMMY: {}  # for security, before 2.10.2
}
system_account: SYS

Solution

Any one of these:

  1. Upgrade the NATS server to at least 2.10.2 (or 2.9.23)
  2. Or define a dummy account
  3. Or complete the migration of authorization entries to be inside a named account in the "accounts" block

Credits

Problem reported by Alex Herrington.
Addressed publicly in a GitHub Discussion prior to this advisory.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
>= 2.2.0, < 2.9.23
2.9.23
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
>= 2.10.0, < 2.10.2
2.10.2
github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
>= 2.2.0, < 2.9.23
>= 2.10.0, < 2.10.2
2.9.23
2.10.2

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 Go → 2.9.23

go
go get github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2@v2.9.23 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.5

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-305: Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness

The authentication algorithm is sound, but the implemented mechanism can be bypassed as the result of a separate weakness that is primary to the authentication error.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-pq2q-rcw4-3hr6
NATS: Pre-auth remote server crash via WebSocket frame length overflow in wsRead
High Also affects github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
GHSA-3f24-pcvm-5jqc
NATS has mTLS verify_and_map authentication bypass via incorrect Subject DN matching
Medium Also affects github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
GHSA-55h8-8g96-x4hj
NATS: Leafnode connections allow spoofing of Nats-Request-Info identity headers
Medium Also affects github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
GHSA-pwx7-fx9r-hr4h
NATS Server: Incomplete Stripping of Nats-Request-Info Header Allows Identity Spoofing
Medium Also affects github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
GHSA-9983-vrx2-fg9c
NATS JetStream has an authorization bypass through its Management API
Medium Also affects github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
GHSA-8r68-gvr4-jh7j
NATS is vulnerable to pre-auth DoS through WebSockets client service
Medium Also affects github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
GHSA-vprv-35vv-q339
NATS has pre-auth server panic via leafnode handling
High Also affects github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2
GHSA-jxxm-27vp-c3m5
NATS allows MQTT clients to bypass ACL checks
Medium Also affects github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2

Credits: Alex Herrington

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