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GHSA-fj4x-m62j-wvwg BIT-superset-2023-37941 CVE-2023-37941 PYSEC-2026-1175

Apache Superset Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability

Medium PyPI
Severity
6.6 / 10
Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS)
35.45%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 98.45% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Fix
2.1.1
Upgrade apache-superset to this version or later

Description

If an attacker gains write access to the Apache Superset metadata database, they could persist a specifically crafted Python object that may lead to remote code execution on Superset's web backend. The Superset metadata db is an 'internal' component that is typically only accessible directly by the system administrator and the superset process itself. Gaining access to that database should be difficult and require significant privileges. This vulnerability impacts Apache Superset versions 1.5.0 up to and including 2.1.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.1.1 or later.

Affected versions

PyPI

PackageVulnerableFixed in
apache-superset
>= 1.5.0, < 2.1.1
2.1.1

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

apache-superset PyPI → 2.1.1

pip
pip install --upgrade "apache-superset>=2.1.1"
poetry
poetry add "apache-superset>=2.1.1"
uv
uv add "apache-superset>=2.1.1"

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 6.6

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Weakness

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently ensuring that the resulting data will be valid.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
  • Implementation: When deserializing data, populate a new object rather than just deserializing. The result is that the data flows through safe input validation and that the functions are safe.
  • Implementation: Explicitly define a final object() to prevent deserialization.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make fields transient to protect them from deserialization. An attempt to serialize and then deserialize a class containing transient fields will result in NULLs where the transient data should be. This is an excellent way to prevent time, environment-based, or sensitive variables from being carried over and used improperly.
  • Implementation: Avoid having unnecessary types or gadgets (a sequence of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process, often found in libraries) available that can be leveraged for malicious ends. This limits the potential for unintended or unauthorized types and gadgets to be leveraged by the attacker. Add only acceptable classes to an allowlist. Note: new gadgets are constantly being discovered, so this alone is not a sufficient mitigation.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Employ cryptography of the data or code for protection. However, it's important to note that it would still be client-side security. This is risky because if the client is compromised then the security implemented on the client (the cryptography) can be bypassed.
  • Operation: Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-5cx2-vq3h-x52c
Apache superset missing check for default SECRET_KEY
Critical Known exploited Also affects apache-superset
GHSA-mwf2-qr4v-94h2
Apache Superset: Read-Only Bypass via Improper Input Validation on PostgreSQL Connections
Medium Also affects apache-superset
GHSA-h294-8fxm-m2pj
Apache Superset allows authenticated users to view sensitive data without explicit permissions
Medium Also affects apache-superset
GHSA-3m2g-v7jf-7fxc
Apache Superset Improper Authorization allows low-privileged users to bypass access controls
Medium Also affects apache-superset
GHSA-gvxg-9hqx-f4rg
Apache Superset allows privileged users to conduct error-based SQL Injection
Medium Also affects apache-superset
GHSA-48m2-v2r8-h23m
Apache Superset: Incomplete DISALLOWED_SQL_FUNCTIONS default list for ClickHouse engine
Medium Also affects apache-superset
GHSA-mhpq-m962-mg92
Apache Superset allows authenticated users to discover metadata about datasources they don't have permission to access
Medium Also affects apache-superset
GHSA-fxgf-3xh6-m2pp
Apache Superset has bypass of `DISALLOWED_SQL_FUNCTIONS` that allows execution of blocked SQL functions
Medium Also affects apache-superset
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