GHSA-ffpj-xv5c-p3gw CVE-2026-59220 PYSEC-2026-3596
Open WebUI: ReDoS in skill-mention regexes causes whole-instance DoS on default config
- Severity
- 6.5 / 10
- Medium · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.57%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 47.36% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
- Fix
0.10.0- Upgrade open-webui to this version or later
Description
Summary
Two regexes in backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py that parse <$skillId|label> skill-mention tags backtrack in O(n²) on input that contains <$ followed by a long run with no closing >. Both run synchronously, on the asyncio event loop, on every chat completion with no feature gate. Because the default deployment is a single uvicorn worker, one such input pins a CPU core inside re and freezes the entire instance for all users until the worker is killed. Any authenticated user can trigger it with one chat message; it also fires accidentally on benign retrieved content (a RAG chunk or tool output) containing the pattern.
Affected versions
>= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0. Fixed in v0.10.0 (there is no 0.9.7 release).
SKILL_MENTION_RE(the extract pattern) has been O(n²) since v0.9.2; exploitable on 0.9.2–0.9.5 with a large input (hundreds of KB).- v0.9.6 added a second, far more aggressive O(n²) in the strip pattern (introduced by the "keep label as readable text" change), so on 0.9.6 a small input is enough to hang the instance.
Both are fixed by the same patch.
Affected component
backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py (line numbers as of v0.9.6):
# line 2223 — used by extract_skill_ids_from_messages(), called unconditionally (~line 2625)
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>')
# line 2247 — used by strip_skill_mentions(), called unconditionally (line 2662)
strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>')
extract_skill_ids_from_messages() runs before the if all_skill_ids: block (that guard gates only skill injection, not the regex), and strip_skill_mentions() runs with no guard at all. Neither requires a skill to exist or any setting to be enabled. Both functions are plain synchronous calls inside the async process_chat_payload coroutine, so they block the event loop; with the default UVICORN_WORKERS=1 (backend/start.sh) the whole instance stalls.
Root cause
[^|>] is a subset of [^>], so the quantifier pair [^|>]+ \|? [^>]* is ambiguous: on input that never closes with >, [^|>]+ greedily consumes the tail, > fails, and the engine backtracks through every split point between [^|>]+ and [^>]* — O(n) positions each doing O(n) work. Polynomial, not exponential, but more than enough to hang a single worker on a ~100 KB input.
Proof of concept
Standalone (no Open WebUI required):
import re, time
EXTRACT = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)\|?[^>]*>')
STRIP = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+\|?([^>]*)>')
for n in (8_000, 16_000, 32_000, 64_000):
s = '<$' + ('a' * n)
for name, rx in (('extract', EXTRACT), ('strip', STRIP)):
t = time.perf_counter(); rx.search(s)
print(f'n={n:>6} {name:>7} = {(time.perf_counter()-t)*1000:8.1f} ms')
Time quadruples per doubling of n (textbook O(n²)); the strip pattern runs for ~6 seconds on a 64k blob and for minutes on a ~96 KB one.
End-to-end against a live instance (default config):
docker run ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:v0.9.6on defaults.- Log in as any user (no admin or skill setup).
- Send a chat message containing
<$followed by 50k+ characters with no>. - One CPU core pegs in
re; UI and API stop responding for every user until the worker is killed.
Patch
Rewrite the optional |label as a non-capturing optional group so the two quantifiers no longer overlap. Both patterns become linear; captures and substituted output are unchanged on well-formed <$id|label>, <$id|>, and bare <$id> mentions.
SKILL_MENTION_RE = re.compile(r'<\$([^|>]+)(?:\|[^>]*)?>')
strip_re = re.compile(r'<\$[^|>]+(?:\|([^>]*))?>')
After the patch the same hostile input returns in under 1 ms. Shipped in v0.10.0.
Credit
Reported by @Vlad-WKG, including a correct root-cause analysis and patch.
Affected versions
PyPI
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| open-webui | >= 0.9.2, < 0.10.0 |
0.10.0 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
open-webui PyPI → 0.10.0
- pip
pip install --upgrade "open-webui>=0.10.0"- poetry
poetry add "open-webui>=0.10.0"- uv
uv add "open-webui>=0.10.0"
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 6.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-1333: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
The product uses a regular expression with a worst-case computational complexity that is inefficient and possibly exponential.
How to prevent it
- Architecture and Design: Use regular expressions that do not support backtracking, e.g. by removing nested quantifiers.
- System Configuration: Set backtracking limits in the configuration of the regular expression implementation, such as PHP's pcre.backtrack_limit. Also consider limits on execution time for the process.
- Implementation: Do not use regular expressions with untrusted input. If regular expressions must be used, avoid using backtracking in the expression.
- Implementation: Limit the length of the input that the regular expression will process.
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
Related advisories
| Advisory | Severity | Why it's related |
|---|---|---|
| GHSA-wvm9-9g5j-623f Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-4qg5-cxx4-g927 Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-jqhh-cjmq-vmv6 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via a cyclic chat message history | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-5x7x-4c3c-qf5w Open WebUI: Server-side fetches reach blocked and internal hosts via unvalidated HTTP redirect targets | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3cgp-3cqx-j8w2 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can hang the server via message deletion in a cyclic chat tree | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-34r3-9m95-vq73 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can reach the Azure platform channel via server-side web fetch | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-2724-6cpj-gf3v Open WebUI: Non-admin users can delete admin-owned external knowledge connections via knowledge base deletion | High | Also affects open-webui |
| GHSA-3pf7-q2g3-wj28 Open WebUI: Any authenticated user can inject chats into another user's folder via chat completions | Medium | Also affects open-webui |
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