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GHSA-f95f-77jx-fcjc CVE-2026-33700 GO-2026-4850

Vikunja has a Link Share Delete IDOR — Missing Project Ownership Check Allows Cross-Project Link Share Deletion

Medium Go
Severity
0.0 / 10
Medium · CVSS 4.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.26%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 17.92% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Fix
2.2.1
Upgrade code.vikunja.io/api to this version or later

Description

Summary

The DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/shares/:share endpoint does not verify that the link share belongs to the project specified in the URL. An attacker with admin access to any project can delete link shares from other projects by providing their own project ID combined with the target share ID.

Details

The permission check in canDoLinkShare (pkg/models/link_sharing_permissions.go:53-70) validates admin access on the project from the :project URL parameter. However, the Delete method at pkg/models/link_sharing.go:305 queries only WHERE id = ? using the share ID, without verifying it belongs to the URL-specified project:

func (share *LinkSharing) Delete(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {
    _, err = s.Where("id = ?", share.ID).Delete(share)
    return
}

This is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2 (task attachment IDOR) and the fixed GHSA-mr3j-p26x-72x4 (task comment IDOR).

Additionally, ReadOne at line 203 has the same pattern (WHERE id = ? only), though it is not currently exploitable because CanRead fails first due to an unrelated issue with the hash parameter binding.

Impact

An authenticated user with admin access to any project can:

  • Delete link shares belonging to any other project in the system
  • Disrupt collaboration by removing shared access links
  • Link share IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial

Reproduction

  1. User A creates Project A and a link share on it (share ID = X)
  2. User B creates Project B (gaining admin access)
  3. User B calls DELETE /api/v1/projects/{projectB_id}/shares/{X}
  4. The permission check passes (User B is admin on Project B)
  5. The delete executes WHERE id = X — deleting User A's link share

Recommended Fix

Change Delete at pkg/models/link_sharing.go:305 to:

_, err = s.Where("id = ? AND project_id = ?", share.ID, share.ProjectID).Delete(share)

Also fix ReadOne at line 203 as defense in depth.

Affected versions

Go

PackageVulnerableFixed in
code.vikunja.io/api
< 2.2.1
2.2.1
code.vikunja.io/api
all versions
No fix yet

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

code.vikunja.io/api Go → 2.2.1

go
go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.2.1 && go mod tidy

Severity breakdown

CVSS 4.0 0.0

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Attack requirements
None
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Confidentiality (vulnerable system)
None
Integrity (vulnerable system)
High
Availability (vulnerable system)
None
Confidentiality (subsequent systems)
None
Integrity (subsequent systems)
None
Availability (subsequent systems)
None

CVSS 3.1 4.9

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
High
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.
  • Architecture and Design, Implementation: Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.
  • Architecture and Design: Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-m687-p538-r5hp
Vikunja: Permissive Cross-domain Security Policy trusts every localhost origin which should not be trusted
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fmmf-xq98-g327
Vikunja: Write-level project members can delete admin-tier link shares through an unloaded permission check
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-pjr3-86v4-5p7w
Vikunja: Explicit lower-permission share on a sub-project is silently overridden by an inherited parent permission (broken access control / privilege-management regression in v2.6.0)
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-hjx8-qv73-f7cm
Vikunja: Webhooks and link shares survive every revocation path, so a removed collaborator keeps a live feed
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-fprf-r6rv-xg99
Vikunja: Saved filter creation with an empty filter string recalculates task positions across all tenants
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-4hv6-xc92-j86g
Vikunja: WebSocket authentication ignores server-side session state, so revoked sessions keep receiving live pushes
High Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-w2ch-4xgr-22ww
Vikunja: Task relation deletion does not check read access to the other task, allowing cross-project relation removal
Low Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
GHSA-8wvg-r2j4-3737
Vikunja: Assignee email addresses disclosed to read-only project members via the task assignees endpoint
Medium Also affects code.vikunja.io/api
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