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GHSA-f27p-cmv8-xhm6 CVE-2025-21620

fetch: Authorization headers not dropped when redirecting cross-origin

High crates.io
Severity
7.5 / 10
High · CVSS 3.0
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.52%
Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 44.29% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited
No
Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Fix
Available
2 packages have a fixed version

Description

Summary

When you send a request with the Authorization header to one domain, and the response asks to redirect to a different domain, Deno'sfetch() redirect handling creates a follow-up redirect request that keeps the original Authorization header, leaking its content to that second domain.

Details

The right behavior would be to drop the Authorization header instead, in this scenario. The same is generally applied to Cookie and Proxy-Authorization headers, and is done for not only host changes, but also protocol/port changes. Generally referred to as "origin".

The documentation states:

Deno does not follow the same-origin policy, because the Deno user agent currently does not have the concept of origins, and it does not have a cookie jar. This means Deno does not need to protect against leaking authenticated data cross origin

Reproduction

const ac = new AbortController()

const server1 = Deno.serve({ port: 3001, signal: ac.signal }, (req) => {
  return new Response(null, {
    status: 302,
    headers: {
      'location': 'http://localhost:3002/redirected'
    },
  })
})

const server2 = Deno.serve({ port: 3002, signal: ac.signal }, (req) => {
  const body = JSON.stringify({
    url: req.url,
    hasAuth: req.headers.has('authorization'),
  })
  return new Response(body, {
    status: 200,
    headers: {'content-type': 'application/json'},
  })
})

async function main() {
  const response = await fetch("http://localhost:3001/", {
    headers: {authorization: 'Bearer foo'}
  })
  const body = await response.json()
  
  ac.abort()
  
  if (body.hasAuth) {
    console.error('ERROR: Authorization header should not be present after cross-origin redirect')
  } else {
    console.log('SUCCESS: Authorization header is not present after cross-origin redirect')
  }
}

setTimeout(main, 500)

Affected versions

crates.io

PackageVulnerableFixed in
deno
<= 1.46.3
No fix yet
deno
>= 2.0.0, < 2.1.2
2.1.2
deno_fetch
>= 0.0.1, < 0.204.0
0.204.0

How to fix

Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.

deno crates.io → 2.1.2

cargo
cargo update -p deno --precise 2.1.2

deno_fetch crates.io → 0.204.0

cargo
cargo update -p deno_fetch --precise 0.204.0

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.0 7.5

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Weakness

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information.

How to prevent it
  • Architecture and Design: Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

References

Timeline

  1. Published
  2. Last updated by the source
  3. Latest EPSS score
AdvisorySeverityWhy it's related
GHSA-x2qc-cmh9-f4hf
Deno: Denial of service via non-ASCII bytes in WebSocket response headers
Medium Also affects deno
GHSA-8xpq-cjcf-3wh9
Deno: Permission Bypass via Unicode Normalization Mismatch on macOS (APFS)
High Also affects deno
GHSA-968w-xfqw-vp9q
Deno: BYONM module resolution allows `package.json` main path traversal to bypass `--allow-read` restrictions
Medium Also affects deno
GHSA-v8fw-85r8-5m23
Deno: Node TCPWrap numeric hostname aliases bypass --deny-net resolved-IP deny checks
Medium Also affects deno
GHSA-9xg4-qhm4-g43w
Deno: Miller-Rabin Primality Test Allows Zero Rounds
High Also affects deno
GHSA-7xh3-mhg9-jcw8
Deno: Command Injection via spawnSync & spawn on Windows
High Also affects deno
GHSA-4c8g-jvcx-v4hv
Deno: process.loadEnvFile() bypasses env permission checks and mutates process.env with only read access
Medium Also affects deno
GHSA-83pc-3rw9-qpwj
Deno: WebSocket API sandbox bypass via missing post-DNS check
Medium Also affects deno
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