GHSA-cwjm-3f7h-9hwq CVE-2026-22045 GO-2026-4322
Traefik's ACME TLS-ALPN fast path lacks timeouts and close on handshake stall
- Severity
- 5.9 / 10
- High · CVSS 3.1
- Exploit chance (EPSS)
- 0.34%
- Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 27.81% of scored vulnerabilities.
- Known exploited
- No
- Not in CISA's catalog
- Weakness
- CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
- Fix
- Available
- 2 packages have a fixed version
Description
Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik ACME TLS certificates' automatic generation: the ACME TLS-ALPN fast path can allow unauthenticated clients to tie up goroutines and file descriptors indefinitely when the ACME TLS challenge is enabled.
A malicious client can open many connections, send a minimal ClientHello with acme-tls/1, then stop responding, leading to denial of service of the entrypoint.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.35
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.7
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>
[Security] ACME TLS-ALPN fast path lacks timeouts and close on handshake stall
Dear Traefik security team,
We believe we have identified a resource-exhaustion issue in the ACME TLS-ALPN fast path that can allow unauthenticated clients to tie up goroutines and file descriptors indefinitely when the ACME TLS challenge is enabled.
Summary
- Affected code:
pkg/server/router/tcp/router.go(ACME TLS-ALPN handling). - When a ClientHello advertises
acme-tls/1, Traefik intercepts it and callstls.Server(...).Handshake()without any read/write deadlines and without closing the connection afterward. - Immediately before this branch, existing deadlines set by the entrypoint are cleared.
- A client that sends the ALPN marker and then stops responding can keep the goroutine and socket open indefinitely, potentially exhausting the entrypoint under load.
- Exposure is limited to entrypoints where the ACME TLS-ALPN challenge is enabled and ACME bypass is not allowed.
Relevant snippets
// Deadlines are cleared before protocol dispatch
if err := conn.SetDeadline(time.Time{}); err != nil {
log.Error().Err(err).Msg("Error while setting deadline")
}
// ACME TLS-ALPN fast path
if !r.acmeTLSPassthrough && slices.Contains(hello.protos, tlsalpn01.ACMETLS1Protocol) {
r.acmeTLSALPNHandler().ServeTCP(r.GetConn(conn, hello.peeked))
return
}
// Handler invoked by the branch above
return tcp.HandlerFunc(func(conn tcp.WriteCloser) {
_ = tls.Server(conn, r.httpsTLSConfig).Handshake()
})
Impact
- Each stalled handshake consumes a goroutine and FD with no timeout and no server-side close.
- A malicious client can open many connections, send a minimal ClientHello with
acme-tls/1, then stop responding, leading to denial of service of the entrypoint. - Normal HTTPS handling uses
http.Servertimeouts; this bespoke path bypasses them.
Conditions for exploitation
- ACME TLS-ALPN challenge enabled (default when configured).
allowACMEByPassdisabled for the entrypoint (the default when ACME TLS challenge is handled by Traefik).
CWE
- CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption.
Proposed fix (illustrative)
@@ func (r *Router) acmeTLSALPNHandler() tcp.Handler {
- return tcp.HandlerFunc(func(conn tcp.WriteCloser) {
- _ = tls.Server(conn, r.httpsTLSConfig).Handshake()
- })
+ return tcp.HandlerFunc(func(conn tcp.WriteCloser) {
+ // Ensure the handshake cannot block indefinitely and always closes the socket.
+ _ = conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second))
+ _ = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second))
+
+ tlsConn := tls.Server(conn, r.httpsTLSConfig)
+ _ = tlsConn.Handshake()
+ _ = tlsConn.Close() // close regardless of handshake outcome
+ })
}
Alternatively, route ACME TLS-ALPN through the existing tcp.TLSHandler/HTTP server path so the configured timeouts and lifecycle management apply automatically.
CVSS v3.1 (estimate)
- Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Base score: 7.5 (High)
- Rationale: Network-only, no auth/user interaction required; impact is service availability via resource exhaustion; no confidentiality or integrity impact.
Please let us know if you would like a PoC or further details. We have not made any code changes in this report.
Let us know if you have any questions or need clarification!
Best wishes,
Pavel Kohout
Aisle Research
</details>
Affected versions
Go
| Package | Vulnerable | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/traefik/traefik | all versions |
No fix yet |
| github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 | < 2.11.35 |
2.11.35 |
| github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 | < 3.6.7 |
3.6.7 |
How to fix
Move to the fixed version or later with your package manager, update the lockfile, and run your tests. If the package only arrives through another dependency, upgrade that dependency first. If none of its releases pulls a fixed version yet, force the version with your package manager's override.
github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 Go → 2.11.35
- go
go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v2@v2.11.35 && go mod tidy
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 Go → 3.6.7
- go
go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v3@v3.6.7 && go mod tidy
Severity breakdown
CVSS 3.1 5.9
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- High
Weakness
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
How to prevent it
- Requirements: Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
- Architecture and Design: Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
- Architecture and Design: Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
- Implementation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Architecture and Design: For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Architecture and Design: Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed. The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- Architecture and Design: Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
- Architecture and Design, Implementation: If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery. Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
- Operation, Architecture and Design: Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems. When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users. Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
References
Advisories
Packages
Other links
Timeline
- Published
- Last updated by the source
- Latest EPSS score
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|---|---|---|
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| GO-2026-6467 Traefik entrypoint header-name sanitization bypassed via request trailers | High | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-rf44-j88r-hh8c Traefik: ForwardAuth identity spoofing via dot-form header alias | High | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-7ghq-v6jf-g56c Traefik: respondingTimeouts.readTimeout is not applied to HTTP/3, leaving slow-body uploads unbounded | Medium | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
| GHSA-62fc-8686-hfmq Traefik: `allowCrossNamespace=false` bypass via `@kubernetescrd` TraefikService backendRef | Medium | Also affects github.com/traefik/traefik |
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