GHSA-chqv-vrj7-qffp CVE-2026-46552

NocoDB: Shared-base link access can invite arbitrary users as persistent base members

Medium npm

Severity: 5.8 / 10; Medium · CVSS 3.1
Exploit chance (EPSS): 0.31%; Chance of exploitation in the next 30 days. Higher than 24.21% of scored vulnerabilities.
Known exploited: No; Not in CISA's catalog
Weakness: CWE-285 Improper Authorization
Fix: None yet; No fixed version published

Description

Summary

Shared-base sessions were granted the same base-member capabilities as authenticated viewers. Using only the shared-base UUID (xc-shared-base-id), an attacker could enumerate base members and invite an arbitrary email into the base as a real member. The invited user could then redeem the invite via the normal signup flow and retain authenticated access even after the owner revoked the shared link.

Details

Shared-base sessions were mapped to ProjectRoles.VIEWER in packages/nocodb/src/strategies/base-view.strategy/base-view.strategy.ts, and packages/nocodb/src/utils/acl.ts granted baseUserList and userInvite to that role. The shared frontend (packages/nc-gui/composables/useApi/interceptors.ts) deliberately removed auth headers in favour of the shared-base header, but the ACL middleware did not distinguish shared sessions from genuine viewers.

The end-to-end chain:

GET /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users returned the member list to shared-base callers (@Acl('baseUserList')).
POST /api/v2/meta/bases/:baseId/users accepted an invite from shared-base callers (@Acl('userInvite')); base-users.service.ts inserted a real nc_users_v2 row with invite_token and a nc_base_users_v2 row for the target base, with invited_by = null.
The invited account redeemed the invite through the normal signup path (users.service.ts), gaining a persistent JWT scoped to the base.
Revoking the shared link did not affect the redeemed account.

Impact

Confidentiality: shared-base link exposes member email addresses.
Integrity: shared-base link can mutate base ACL state by creating new members.
Persistence: link-based access converts into durable authenticated access that survives revocation of the share.

Credit

This issue was reported by @0xmrma.

Affected versions

npm

Package	Vulnerable	Fixed in
nocodb	`<= 0.301.3`	No fix yet

How to fix

No fixed version has been published yet. Until one is, remove or replace the package, or turn off or isolate the affected feature. This page updates when a fix ships.

Severity breakdown

CVSS 3.1 5.8

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: None
User interaction: None
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Weakness

CWE-285: Improper Authorization

The product does not perform or incorrectly performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

How to prevent it

Architecture and Design: Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries. Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Architecture and Design: Ensure that you perform access control checks related to your business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that you apply to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor.
Architecture and Design: Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Architecture and Design: For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page. One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
System Configuration, Installation: Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

References

Advisories

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46552

Packages

github.com/nocodb/nocodb

Timeline

May 21, 2026 Published
Jul 20, 2026 Last updated by the source
Oct 31, 2026 Latest EPSS score

Advisory	Severity	Why it's related
GHSA-hmcr-rmjq-47qr NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Spreadsheet Import Endpoint	Medium	Also affects nocodb
GHSA-h6vv-pcq8-7xm4 NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Base Migration URL	Medium	Also affects nocodb
GHSA-6mhr-74x2-98v9 NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Secure Attachment	Medium	Also affects nocodb
GHSA-r989-7g3j-wjhw NocoDB: Refresh Tokens Persist Through Password Recovery	Medium	Also affects nocodb
GHSA-gprh-27j3-g5h4 NocoDB: Server-Side Request Forgery via Spreadsheet Fetch URL	Medium	Also affects nocodb
GHSA-g72g-r7m4-9x4g NocoDB: OAuth Tokens Persist Through Security Events	Medium	Also affects nocodb
GHSA-xxpj-q764-9r6q NocoDB: Missing Ownership Check in MCP Attachment Read	Low	Also affects nocodb
GHSA-hj85-ph9q-78jg NocoDB: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Form View Redirect URL	High	Also affects nocodb

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