OpenClaw Google Chat spoofing access with allowlist authorized mutable email principal despite sender-ID mismatch

Summary

Google Chat allowlisting supports matching by sender email in addition to immutable sender resource name (users/<id>). This weakens identity binding if a deployment assumes allowlists are strictly keyed by immutable principals.

Affected Packages / Versions

(As of 2026-02-14; based on latest published npm versions)

• openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.13
• clawdbot (npm): <= 2026.1.24-3

Details

Affected component:

• extensions/googlechat/src/monitor.ts

The allowFrom checks accept:

• Immutable sender id (users/<id>)
• Raw email (alice@example.com) for usability

Historically, users/<email> was also treated as an email allowlist entry. This is now deprecated because it looks like an immutable ID but is actually a mutable principal.

Security Triage (2026-02-14)

Severity: Low

Rationale:

• Requests are authenticated as coming from Google Chat (token verification), so this is not a generic unauthenticated spoofing vector.
• A realistic exploit generally requires Google Workspace / IdP administrative control over identity lifecycle (e.g. reassigning an email address to a different underlying account) to obtain the same email with a different users/<id>.
• With that level of access, the attacker typically has broader compromise paths.

We still treat it as a valid defense-in-depth report because accepting mutable principals in authorization decisions can increase risk in chained-failure scenarios.

Remediation / Behavior Changes

Goal: preserve usability while reducing footguns.

• Raw email allowlists remain supported.
• users/<email> is deprecated and treated as a user id, not as an email allowlist.
• Documentation recommends users/<id> when strict immutable binding is required.

Fix Commit(s)

• c8424bf29a921e25663b29f308640b3d91a49432 (PR #16243)

Thanks @vincentkoc for reporting.